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The Losing Battle: Veterans’ Backlogged Mental Health Issues Need 
Reinforcements 
Daniel Gilbert 
Daniel.Gilbert@student.shu.edu 
 
 President Barack Obama 
used the recent “State of the Un-
ion” address to definitively end 
the war in Afghanistan. Approxi-
mately 34,000 American service-
men and women will come home 
by the end of this year with the 
remaining 32,000 soldiers home 
by 2014’s end.1 But at what cost? 
Our servicemen and women con-
stantly place themselves in 
harm’s way, sacrificing their 
lives and their limbs to ensure 
American victories. It goes with-
out saying that these honorable 
men and women deserve our sup-
port. Yet the support they need 
extends beyond a hug and a 
handshake; a job and a paycheck; 
and a home. These heroes also 
need accessible mental health 
services as the incidence of men-
tal health problems among re-
turning soldiers continues to rise.  
 One report by the Con-
gressional Research Service, spe-
cifically a statistical analysis of 
the Iraq and Afghanistan wars 
produced by members and com-
mittees of Congress, estimated 
there are currently 50,450 
wounded soldiers as a result of 
these conflicts.2 Yet, some be-
lieve this figure is, at best, a very 
conservative estimate. Former 
Congressman Bob Filner esti-
mates that over one million veter-
ans have sought help from the 
United States Department of Vet-
erans Affairs (“VA”).3 Secretary 
of Veterans Affairs Eric Shinseki 
further states that the most recent 
data indicates “roughly 67%” of 
the approximately 1.4 million 
veterans returning from the re-
cent conflicts rely on aid, com-
pensation, or support from the 
VA.4 One unpublished study pro-
vided by the VA, entitled “VA 
Benefits Activity: Veterans De-
ployed To The Global War On 
Terror,” stated that through May 
2012, there were 1,634,569 veter-
ans from post-9/11 conflicts, of 
which 46% have filed disability 
claims.5  
 Further, the unseen ill-
nesses and mental health condi-
tions like Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD), Traumatic 
Brain Injury (TBI), and depres-
sion have also gone unreported. 
One VA-commissioned study, 
conducted by RAND Health of 
The RAND Corporation and the 
Altarum Institute, found veterans 
with schizophrenia, bipolar disor-
der, PTSD, major depressive dis-
order, and substance use disorder 
“[comprised] a large and growing 
number of veterans with severe 
and complex general medical, 
mental, and substance-use disor-
ders and accounts for a dispropor-
tionately large proportion of utiliza-
tion and costs for the VA”.6 Another 
study suggests that 834,467 veterans 
have sought VA healthcare since 
being discharged. Of these veterans, 
444,551 (53%) have been diagnosed 
with “mental disorders” – though the 
study notes that this number might 
encompass an individual veteran 
multiple times due to multiple diag-
noses.7 Whether out of pride or ina-
bility to access resources, many vet-
erans are reluctant to seek help. This 
issue must be addressed as our veter-
ans with mental disorders cannot 
continue to be left without proper 
services. 
 The VA claims on its web 
site that up to 20 of every 100 Veter-
ans of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars 
suffer from PTSD. These numbers 
parallel those of America’s most re-
cent wars: 10 of every 100 Gulf War 
Veterans and approximately 30 of 
every 100 Vietnam Veterans.8 These 
figures are unacceptable and further 
illustrate the need for better access 
to mental health services for our vet-
erans. The 2013 Congressional Re-
search Service survey reports that 
103,792 deployed service members 
were diagnosed with PTSD as of 
December 7, 2012.9 These numbers 
are skewed for a few reasons. First, a 
service member might have devel-
oped PTSD before deployment. Dis-
tinguishing when a service member 
first demonstrated PTSD symptoms 
is often a difficult task. Second, the 
Army Office of the Surgeon General 
qualifies that a diagnosis of PTSD is 
validated when an individual has 
THE 2013 CONGRESSION-
AL RESEARCH SERVICE 
SURVEY REPORTS THAT 
103,792 DEPLOYED SER-
VICE MEMBERS WERE DI-
AGNOSED WITH PTSD AS 
OF DECEMBER 7, 2012.  
DoD and VA) to 396 days joint-
ly.13 
 These numbers are great, 
considering where the programs 
started. However, the the issue of 
access to these services is still 
prevalent because the number of 
claims entered and benefits 
sought is not expected to de-
crease. In fact, last May 2012, the 
VA reported 904,000 claims.14 
This current year’s end is ex-
pected to yield more than 1.25 
million claims. The backlogged 
claims, lasting longer than 125 
days to be reviewed, were, for 
May 2012, numbering at more 
than 65%, or 550,000 of the 
904,000 total claims. This number 
is indicative of a larger problem 
the VA and DoD cannot remedy 
quickly enough: Neither the VA 
or the DoD have the manpower or 
resources to adequately support 
our wounded heroes. 
 The VA and DoD need to 
make changes. The status quo is 
inadequate. We call these brave 
Americans into combat only to 
fall short on our end of the bar-
gain. Perhaps the VA and DoD 
should use private health care 
companies, such as United 
HealthCare, Blue Cross Blue 
Shield, and Aetna. These compa-
nies have the financial resources 
and qualified doctors within their 
networks to care for the rising in-
cidence of mental health prob-
lems. United HealthCare, for ex-
ample, has 712,622 physicians 
and health care professionals, 
80,000 dentists and 5,594 hospi-
tals within its network.15 Aetna 
has over 1 million health care pro-
 
are jointly combating these prob-
lems together, primarily with the 
development of the Integrated Dis-
ability Evaluation System 
(“IDES”). 
 The IDES, which has been 
in use for the past two years, is ad-
vertised as “a seamless and trans-
parent Disability Evaluation Sys-
tem”.11 The Wounded, Ill and In-
jured Compensation & Benefits 
Handbook, administered by the 
DoD, states that the IDES is now 
used at more than 139 VA facili-
ties across the country, ultimately 
allowing “military members to file 
a VA disability claim when they 
are referred to the Disability Eval-
uation System.”12 According to 
Secretary Panetta, the IDES has 
increased the effectiveness of the 
joint disability system, ensuring 
that service members are cared for 
quicker and more efficiently. Spe-
cifically, the time it takes to transi-
tion from military discharge to re-
ceipt of VA disability compensa-
tion has decreased by 70%, from 
243 to 63 days. Additionally, the 
overall time to receive disability 
compensation is reduced by 26%, 
from 540 (conducted separately by 
accumulated “at least two outpa-
tient visits or one or more hospi-
talizations at which PTSD was 
diagnosed. The threshold of two 
or more outpatient visits is used 
in the Defense Medical Surveil-
lance System to increase the like-
lihood that the individual has, or 
had, PTSD.”10 If a veteran visits a 
VA to get a consultation but does 
not have a subsequent follow up 
visit, a PTSD diagnosis is not 
considered valid by the Army 
Office of the Surgeon General. 
This lack of diagnosis may be 
due to a lack of adequate re-
sources, funding and able medi-
cal professionals. 
 These figures tell a deeper 
tale – one not anticipated by ci-
vilians, the Department of De-
fense (“DoD”), or the VA. Per-
haps the departments failed to 
identify the potential problems 
that an increase in wounded ser-
vice members would cause, or 
perhaps they did not want to 
share the information with the 
rest of the country. Either way, 
progress and reform is necessary.  
Finally, improvement is on the 
horizon.  
 During a joint hearing 
before the House Armed Services 
Committee and the House Veter-
ans’ Affairs Committee, Defense 
Secretary Leon Panetta and Sec-
retary of Veterans Affairs Eric 
Shinseki discussed the major 
problems facing today’s veterans, 
and the support system entrusted 
to treat them. Among the prob-
lems addressed was the prolifera-
tion of PTSD. The VA and DoD 
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fessionals, approximately 600,000 
doctors and specialists, and 5,400 
hospitals in network.16 Medical 
treatment for veterans would be 
readily available, and become 
more efficient.  Veterans would 
not have to drive several hours 
away to see a medical doctor at a 
VA. A doctor within one of these 
health care companies’ networks 
would be available to treat a veter-
an. The greater availability would 
help alleviate the number of back-
logged claims. 
 The use of private health 
insurance companies is only one 
suggestion worth exploring by 
the VA and DoD.  We must deal 
with this challenge now. Service 
for many veterans does not stop 
after an honorable discharge or a 
military victory. For many, the 
battle continues long after they 
exchange their military gear for 
civilian clothes. The transition 
back into society is hard 
enough. We need to do what 
we can and take better care of 
our veterans. They have sacri-
ficed life and limb. The time is 
now for us to do our part. 
 
UP TO 20 OF EVERY 100 
VETERANS OF THE IRAQ 
AND AFGHANISTAN WARS 
SUFFERS FROM PTSD. 
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Surrogacy and Silence: Why State Legislatures Should Attempt to 
Regulate Gestational Surrogacy Agreements 
was successful for Giuliana and 
Bill as they now have a healthy, 
thriving baby boy.8 While the 
couple’s story appears inspiring, 
the process can be riddled with 
legal complexity due to a lack 
of statutory regulation. In the 
United States, a majority of 
state legislatures have remained 
silent as to the legality of surro-
gacy contracts and as to the 
question of parental rights when 
such contracts are signed.  The 
failure of state legislatures to 
regulate in this area leaves par-
ties without guidance and can 
ultimately harm well-meaning 
parents and innocent children.10 
 Several state courts have 
developed tests to determine 
parental rights when surrogacy 
contracts have been entered into 
because the state legislatures are 
silent on the issue.  New Jersey 
state courts have banned surro-
gacy contracts as a matter of 
public policy.11 California has 
consistently used an intent-
based test, which considers the 
intending parents that initiated 
the surrogacy process, to be the 
legal parents of the resulting 
child.12 Alternatively, Ohio de-
parted from an intent-based test 
and adopted a genetic-based 
test, which considers the genetic 
link between the parent and the 
child to be the dispositive factor 
in deciphering parental rights.13  
A few states have attempted to 
regulate surrogacy contracts, 
either by banning them or tak-
ing a selective approach in re-
 gards to what types of surrogacy 
contracts the state will render en-
forceable.14  
 While the lack of regula-
tion of surrogacy contracts does 
not pose a problem in unremarka-
ble cases, such legislative silence 
can have devastating results for 
some families.  If the surrogacy 
process goes awry, the parties that 
entered in to a surrogacy agree-
ment could spend years litigating 
over whom the child’s legal par-
ents are.  As evidenced by the var-
ious tests state courts have adopt-
ed, there is not much uniformity 
from state to state regarding surro-
gacy.  The unpredictability of 
what a particular state court might 
decide makes surrogacy a precari-
ous method of ART for those in 
states where no statutory guidance 
or case law is provided.15  To ad-
dress this problem, state legisla-
tures should regulate gestational 
surrogacy contracts as this method 
has seen expansive growth over 
the last decade and the utilization 
of this method is only predicted to 
increase with time. 
 
Assisted Reproductive  
Technology: Surrogacy 
 
 Generally, those seeking to 
start a family unit have three op-
tions: natural conception, adop-
tion, and surrogacy.  Since natural 
conception may not be an option 
for many seeking to start a family, 
they must revert to the latter two 
options.  If an individual or family 
opts for gestational surrogacy and 
utilizes its own gametes, it has a 
Melissa Cartine 
Macartine@gmail.com 
 
 In 2011, television per-
sonalities and married couple, 
Giuliana and Bill Rancic, re-
vealed their struggle to have a 
child on their television show 
“Giuliana and Bill.” 1 The couple 
had struggled for several years to 
get pregnant through in vitro fer-
tilization (IVF), which is one 
method of assisted reproductive 
technology (ART).2  In 2011, 
Giuliana was diagnosed with 
breast cancer and although treat-
ment was successful for her can-
cer, she would not be able to con-
ceive naturally for a number of 
years due to the cancer.3 As the 
couple desperately wanted to be 
parents, they opted for another 
form of ART, surrogacy.4 Genet-
ically, Giuliana is the mother of 
the resulting child.5 Her eggs 
were combined with her hus-
band’s sperm to form an embryo 
that was implanted into the surro-
gate.6 This type of surrogacy is 
called gestational surrogacy.7 
 The surrogacy process 
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genetic link with the child, mak-
ing it the closet option to natural 
conception.  Thus, it is easy to 
fathom why so many families 
place their faith in the surrogacy 
process despite its potential legal 
pitfalls due to lack of statutory 
regulation.   
 The term surrogacy usu-
ally refers to one of two meth-
ods: gestational and traditional. 
The Rancic couple opted for the 
former method, which usually 
creates a genetic link between 
the child and at least one intend-
ing parent contracting to have a 
surrogate carry their child. As 
described previously, a woman’s 
egg is removed and combined 
with her partner’s sperm before 
being implanted into a third per-
son, the surrogate.16 If only one 
or no intending parent can supply 
gametes, then third party donors 
could be used to supply the need-
ed gametes.17 This would also be 
considered gestational surroga-
cy.18 In both such arrangements, 
the surrogate has no genetic link 
to the child since her gametes 
were not used.19 Those that 
choose to can instead utilize the 
surrogate’s eggs.20 This is called 
traditional surrogacy and creates 
a genetic link between the child 
and the surrogate.21  
 According to the Society 
of Assisted Reproductive Tech-
nology (SART), gestational sur-
rogacy is the method more fre-
quently used today.22 However, 
the Council for Responsible Ge-
netics claims that accurate statis-
tics are not available to deduce 
how many more people have uti-
lized this method rather than tra-
ditional surrogacy.23  Instead, the 
Council for Responsible Genetics 
found that studies that looked at 
IVF success rates demonstrate 
that the rate of gestational surro-
gacy has increased dramatically 
and will continue to do so over 
time.24 The data from IVF success 
rates itself can be used to deter-
mine that gestational surrogacy 
arrangements have increased be-
cause in the gestational surrogacy 
process, the embryo of the intend-
ing parents is then implanted via 
IVF into the surrogate’s uterus.25 
The CDC requires ART clinics, 
which perform IVF, to report the 
success rates of IVF cycles and to 
report when the patient is a gesta-
tional surrogate.26 
 The Council for Responsi-
ble Genetics is hesitant to con-
clude that gestational surrogacy is 
more prevalent than traditional 
surrogacy because the metric used 
to determine success rates of IVF 
is the IVF cycle.27 The measure-
ment does not consider the indi-
vidual, so there is no way to know 
how many women actually serve 
as surrogates.28  As previously 
highlighted, the Council for Re-
sponsible Genetics did conclude 
that the rate utilization of gesta-
tional surrogacy has increased 
dramatically, doubling from 2004 
to 2008.29 It was also comfortable 
in predicting that the rapid growth 
of gestational surrogacy was not 
likely to slow in the future.30 
 
Seminal Case Law 
 
 There are a few states that 
attempt to deal with the legal is-
sues that arise in surrogacy via the 
court system and case law, and 
then, some states that provide leg-
islative guidance in regards to 
surrogacy.31 Specifically, there 
are two seminal surrogacy cases 
that are cited extensively: In Re 
Baby M and Johnson v. Calvert.   
 The traditional method of 
surrogacy was used by the Stern 
family in In re Baby M.32  In this 
case, the Sterns entered into a sur-
rogacy agreement whereby Mr. 
Stern’s sperm was implanted into 
the surrogate.33 The Stern family 
opted to use the surrogate’s eggs 
due to Mrs. Stern’s fertility is-
sues, although no court or legal 
commentary has expounded upon 
what those fertility issues were.34  
Up until the child was born, the 
process had been successful for 
the Sterns.35 Then, the surrogate, 
Mary Beth Whitehead, decided 
that she wanted to keep the child 
and the Sterns sued for parental 
rights.36  The New Jersey Su-
preme Court was left to decide 
who the child’s parents were as 
the state legislature provided no 
statutory guidance on the mat-
 
Continued... 
ter.37 The court invalidated the sur-
rogacy contract between the Sterns 
and the surrogate based on public 
policy implications that it felt 
stemmed from such agreements.38 
The court reasoned that surrogacy 
agreements exploited lower income 
individuals, who would be inclined 
to use their bodies for money.39 
Ultimately, the court used the best 
interests of the child analysis to 
determine placement of the child.40  
It reasoned that placing the child 
with the Sterns was the best out-
come for the child.41 The court did 
find the surrogate to be the child’s 
legal mother, and thus, Mrs. Stern 
could not adopt Melissa until she 
became an adult.42 
 While protection from ex-
ploitation of lower income individ-
uals was a guiding public policy 
concern for the New Jersey Su-
preme Court in Baby M, this is not 
the only theory that has been of-
fered in response to the legal issues 
surrounding surrogacy.  There is 
also the feminist approach, which 
advocates for the enforceability of 
surrogacy contracts, under the view 
that a woman should have autono-
my of her body and its reproduc-
tive capabilities.43 
 A California court appeared 
to adopt a more feminist approach, 
considering the freedom to contract 
in its analysis of a surrogacy agree-
ment in Johnson v. Calvert.44 In 
this case, the Calverts, seeking to 
start a family, used the gestational 
method of surrogacy.  The court 
used an intent-based analysis.46 It 
reasoned that but-for the Calverts, 
who had the intent to bring the 
VOLUME VI, ISSUE 2 PAGE 10 
‘Surrogacy and Silence’ 
child into the world, the child 
would not exist and, therefore, 
they were the child’s legal par-
ents.47   
 This case is clearly factu-
ally different than In Re Baby M, 
where the Sterns used the tradi-
tional method of surrogacy.45  The 
facts in Johnson v. Calvert proba-
bly made it more palatable for the 
court to find the Calverts to be the 
child’s legal parents as they had a 
genetic link.  But the court was 
unequivocal in regards to the par-
ties’ freedom to contract when it 
stated, “[T]he parties voluntarily 
agreed to participate in in vitro 
fertilization and related medical 
procedures before the child was 
conceived; at the time when Anna 
[the surrogate] entered into the 
contract, therefore, she was not 
vulnerable to financial induce-
ments to part with her own ex-
pected offspring.”48  This part of 
the court’s analysis was less pa-
ternalistic than the approach the 
New Jersey Supreme took in Ba-
by M, and thus, exemplified an-
other policy that could shape a 
court’s decision in a surrogacy 
case. 
 Another case that is illus-
trative of how a court may decide 
when presented with a surrogacy 
agreement gone awry is Belsito v. 
Clark.  In this case, the Clarks 
sought to start a family via the 
gestational surrogacy method.49  
The court did not use the intent-
based test of Johnson v. Calvert 
but instead looked to the genetic 
link of the parents to the child.50  
The Ohio court limited the legal 
parents in a surrogacy agreement 
to those with a genetic link to the 
child.51 Although the court’s deci-
sion made surrogacy contracts 
more predictable at the outset, it is 
important to note that it also ex-
panded the amount of individuals 
that could not be deemed to be the 
legal parents of a child resulting 
from gestational surrogacy ar-
rangements.   
 
Current Statutory Regulation 
 
 A few states and the feder-
al district of Washington, D.C. 
have banned surrogacy agree-
ments.52 In Washington, D.C. all 
surrogacy contracts are unenforce-
able and the entrance into such 
agreements may result in prison 
confinement, fines, or potentially 
both.53 New York has also banned 
all surrogacy agreements.54 In the 
state of New York, the heaviest 
penalties are for those who act as 
intermediaries, which could be 
anyone who tries to facilitate a 
surrogacy contract.55 Michigan 
also bans surrogacy agreements; 
its statutory scheme closely re-
sembles New York’s approach.56  
Finally, Nebraska and Indiana 
have also statutorily banned surro-
gacy contracts.57 
 While statutory regulation 
of surrogacy is the exception ra-
ther than the norm in the United 
States, a few states have attempted 
to provide guidance to those seek-
ing to start a family via surrogacy.  
Florida allows for gestational 
agreements but requires that the 
intending parents must be mar-
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ried.58 Several other states such 
as Virginia, Texas, and Nevada 
have similar statutory frame-
works to Florida regarding ges-
tational agreements.59  Finally, 
Illinois has some of the most 
comprehensive legislation re-
garding gestational surrogacy 
agreements.60 
 Illinois enacted its Gesta-
tional Surrogacy Act (GSA) to 
standardize various aspects of a 
gestational surrogacy agree-
ment.61 Under the GSA, intend-
ing parents will be deemed the 
legal parents of the child result-
ing from a gestational surrogacy 
arrangement when certain re-
quirements have been met.62  
First, those seeking to a start a 
family through this method of 
surrogacy must be doing so out 
of medical necessity.63 The GSA 
also requires that at least one 
intending parent supply repro-
ductive cells to be implanted in 
the surrogate.64 There has been 
some criticism of Illinois’s ap-
proach, which provides guidance 
for only intending parents who 
can supply gametes.65 It is un-
derstandable that some individu-
als feel this is unfair, as the in-
tending parents who use only donor 
gametes are not protected by Illi-
nois’s GSA.    
 Another feature of the GSA 
is Illinois’s attempt to protect the 
surrogate via certain eligibility re-
quirements: 
 
A gestational surrogate shall 
be deemed to have satisfied 
the requirements of this Act 
if she has met the following 
requirements at the time the 
gestational surrogacy con-
tract is executed:  
(1) she is at least 21 years of 
age;  
(2) she has given birth to at 
least one child; 
(3) she has completed a med-
ical evaluation; 
(4) she has completed a men-
tal health evaluation66   
 
A surrogate must be, at a minimum, 
21 years of age.  The statute also re-
quires that the surrogate have previ-
ously bore a child and mandates 
mental and physical health evalua-
tions.67 These regulations aim to en-
sure that the woman choosing to be-
come a gestational surrogate is men-
tally fit to be one.68 
 Regulation in the form of eli-
gibility requirements may have pre-
vented a heart-breaking case of a 
gestational arrangement gone awry.  
Crystal Kelley, a 29-year old wom-
an, agreed to be the gestational sur-
rogate for a Connecticut couple.69 
Everything was going according to 
plan until about half way through the 
pregnancy.70 
 In February 2012, an ultra-
sound revealed that the baby that 
Ms. Kelley was carrying had 
severe deformities including a 
brain cyst, heart abnormality, 
and cleft palate.71 The baby 
would require numerous surger-
ies and constant medical treat-
ment.72 This medical treatment 
would be immensely expen-
sive.73 Furthermore, the surroga-
cy agreement that Ms. Kelley 
and the couple entered into had a 
specific clause, which stated that 
Ms. Kelley was to abort the baby 
in the event of a “severe fetus 
abnormality.”74 
 The Connecticut couple 
desperately wanted Ms. Kelley 
to have an abortion.75 They even 
offered her an extra $10,000 dol-
lars to abort the baby.76 Ms. Kel-
ley presented a counter-offer of 
$15,000 dollars but the couple 
would not pay it.77 Ultimately, 
Ms. Kelley claimed she would 
not have an abortion for reli-
gious reasons.78 
 While Connecticut has 
case law that may be instruc-
tive to parties entering into sur-
rogacy arrangements, the legis-
lature has not produced any-
thing comprehensive regarding 
such arrangements.79 Mandat-
ing eligibility requirements, 
such as a mental health evalua-
tion of the surrogate, may have 
revealed Ms. Kelley’s anti-
abortion beliefs.  Such infor-
mation may have made the 
Connecticut couple reconsider 
entering into an agreement 
with a woman whose religious 
beliefs were in opposition to 
REGULATION IN THE 
FORM OF ELIGIBILITY 
REQUIREMENTS MAY 
HAVE PREVENTED A 
HEART-BREAKING 
CASE OF A GESTATION-
AL ARRANGEMENT 
GONE AWRY. 
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the abortion provision in the sur-
rogacy contract.   
 The legal process between 
Ms. Kelley and the Connecticut 
couple became increasingly more 
painful and complex for the parties 
as each day passed.80 Under Con-
necticut case law, the intending 
parents privy to the surrogacy 
agreement are the lawful parents 
of the child resulting from the ar-
rangement.81 When it became clear 
that Ms. Kelley would not have an 
abortion, the couple decided that 
right after the baby’s birth, they 
would give the baby to the state.82  
Upon learning this, Ms. Kelley 
decided to flee to Michigan, where 
the state laws deemed her to be the 
legal mother of the baby.83  She 
bore a baby girl who is now 
known as Baby S.84 Ms. Kelley 
knew that financial factors would 
prevent her from keeping the ba-
by.85  She gave Baby S up for 
adoption to another couple.86 Since 
being born, Baby S has undergone 
serious surgeries on her heart and 
her intestines, with more major 
surgeries to come in the future.87 
 
Conclusion 
 
 As discussed previously, 
SART has concluded that gesta-
tional surrogacy is the more preva-
lent type of surrogacy.88 The 
Council of Responsible Genetics 
has concluded that the method of 
gestational surrogacy has seen rap-
id growth and has predicted that 
this trend is not likely to slow 
down.89  Since the trend demon-
‘Surrogacy and Silence’ 
strates rapid growth in the utilization 
of gestational surrogacy, pragmatism 
would suggest that state legislatures 
should begin to thoroughly regulate 
this method of surrogacy.  From a 
humanistic standpoint, those seeking 
to start a family utilizing surrogacy 
likely have infertility issues or an al-
ternative family unit and have en-
dured emotional hardships as a result.  
Comprehensive statutory regulation 
that aims to guide and protect both 
the intending parents and the gesta-
tional surrogate will prevent such 
families from experiencing more 
emotional hardships such as being 
dragged through years of litigation to 
assume parental rights over a child.   
 While the recommendation is 
that only gestational surrogacy be 
regulated by state legislatures, a ban 
on traditional surrogacy would have 
serious implications where both part-
ners are infertile and cannot afford 
gestational  surrogacy but wish to 
start a family. When such arrange-
ments do not work out, the court sys-
tem is best apt to deal with the chal-
lenges presented by such scenarios.   
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Introduction 
 
 In the winter of 2000 an un-
documented Guatemalan migrant 
laborer named Luis Jimenez was 
struck by a Florida drunk driver and 
suffered traumatic brain damage, 
among other serious injuries, that 
would forever change his life.1  
Doctors at the Martin Memorial 
Medical Center, where Jimenez was 
taken after the accident, treated him 
until June 2000, when he was trans-
ferred to a nursing home.2 In Janu-
ary 2001, Jimenez was readmitted to 
the hospital for emergency treat-
ment.3 Because he was unable to 
pay for his medical care, which to-
taled more than $1.5 million, a court 
granted an order allowing the Martin 
Memorial Medical Center to forci-
bly return Jimenez to his native 
Guatemala.4  The order was issued 
over the objections of Jimenez and 
his court appointed guardian.5  
 Today, Luis Jimenez, who is 
now 37, cannot walk and has the 
mental age of a young child.6 He is 
cared for by his elderly mother in 
Guatemala.  In the summer of 2008 
New York Times reporter Deborah 
Sontag visited Jimenez and found 
him largely confined to his bed suf-
fering from routine seizures.7 He 
had not received medical care for 
over five years.8 
 Hospitals in the United 
States that receive federal Medicare 
funding are required to provide 
emergency treatment regardless 
of ability to pay and immigration 
status.9 This is how Luis Jimenez 
was able to receive emergency 
medical care at the Martin Me-
morial Medical Center in Florida 
after his accident.  However, 
once a patient is stabilized, the 
federal government ceases to pay 
for ongoing medical care in both 
hospitals and rehabilitation and 
nursing facilities.10 There is dis-
pute over whether the require-
ment in the Emergency Medical 
Treatment and Labor Act 
(“EMTALA”), which requires 
hospitals to stabilize patients be-
fore releasing or transferring 
them, continues to apply after the 
patient has been admitted to the 
hospital.11 What is clear, howev-
er, is that many private and even 
public hospitals have begun to 
forcibly and coercively deport 
undocumented immigrant pa-
tients to their native countries 
when they are unable to pay for 
provided medical care.12 Luis 
Jimenez is just one example of 
countless individuals who have 
been adversely affected by this 
practice.13 Other patients are 
deemed stabilized and released 
from the hospital without the 
prospect of continuing medical 
care. 
 The emergency medical 
care mandated by EMTALA is 
the only federally funded public 
health care available to undocu-
mented immigrants in the United 
States.14 Because federal funds 
may not be used to provide non-
emergency health care to undoc-
umented immigrants, those who 
are in this country illegally are 
ineligible to receive federally 
funded public health insurance 
programs, including Medicaid, 
Medicare, and the Child Health 
Insurance Program (CHIP).15  
Had Luis Jimenez had access to 
some form of sustained public 
health care after his accident, it 
is possible that he would not be 
largely confined to his bed suf-
fering from routine seizures to-
day.  Luis Jimenez’s case clear-
ly demonstrates that EMTA-
LA’s provisions alone are insuf-
ficient to adequately care for the 
medical needs of the vulnerable 
undocumented immigrant popu-
lation.16  As a nation that pur-
ports to respect the life and dig-
nity of all people, we must do 
more to provide access to medi-
cal care for everyone within our 
borders, even those here unlaw-
fully.  
 
Providing Health Care to Un-
documented Immigrants is 
Our Social Responsibility 
 
 We have a social respon-
sibility to provide for the medi-
cal needs of all those within our 
borders.  This includes undocu-
mented, or illegal, immigrants.  
Regardless of where a person 
came from, how they arrived in 
the United States, how long they 
have been here, or what legal 
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status they hold, every person 
within the borders of the United 
States should have access to medi-
cal care. For vulnerable popula-
tions such as undocumented immi-
grants such access cannot exist 
without the ability to receive fed-
erally funded public health insur-
ance benefits, for example, from 
Medicaid, Medicare, or CHIP.   
 It has long been undisputed 
that undocumented immigrants are 
highly susceptible to receiving un-
compensated medical care.17 Poor 
living and harsh working condi-
tions, as well as the lack of suffi-
cient income to pay for health in-
surance or medical care, are para-
mount reasons why undocumented 
immigrants often rely on EMTA-
LA as their only option to seek 
medical care in hospital emergen-
cy rooms.18  A lack of preventative 
and early intervention care has de-
veloped among this population as 
a result.19 Moreover, seriously ill 
and injured undocumented immi-
grants often must make the diffi-
cult choice of staying in the United 
States where they are unable to 
receive necessary medical treat-
ment, or leaving their family be-
hind and return to their native 
country in order to receive medical 
care.  This, of course, is condi-
tioned on them having not already 
been forcibly medically repatriated 
by the treating hospital here in the 
United States.20  Access to health 
care and federally funded health 
insurance programs for the immi-
grant population at large, and in 
particular the undocumented im-
migrant population, is an im-
‘The Social Responsibility’ 
portant issue for everyone in the 
United States. Such access will 
limit the amount of uncompen-
sated medical care provided, will 
increase the overall health of our 
population, and will foster our 
nation’s commitment to equality 
and fairness for every person 
within our borders. 
 The long-term health and 
societal benefits that stem from 
increased access to health care, 
including preventative and early 
intervention care, expound our 
social responsibility to provide 
federally funded health care to 
undocumented immigrants.  First, 
the entire population benefits 
from providing the health care to 
an at-risk and vulnerable popula-
tion.  Undocumented immigrants 
“live, work, and attend school in 
communities throughout the coun-
try; laws and bureaucratic barriers 
that reduce their use of key pre-
ventative health services, such as 
immunizations and screenings for 
infectious disease, make for bad 
public health policy…” reports 
Susan Okie, a volunteer physi-
cian at a primary care clinic in 
Maryland that cares for unin-
sured immigrants from Latin 
America and West Africa.21  In 
addition to increasing access to 
quality care and decreasing costs 
of quality care for everyone in 
the system, extending coverage 
to undocumented immigrants 
“would also have carry-over 
benefits in the realm of public 
health, as it would begin to act as 
a preventative regime rather than 
allowing the progression of ill-
ness to more advanced points.”22  
For a population that has lower 
frequencies of doctor’s visits and 
lower utilization of health care 
services, access to health care 
and health care coverage can 
help prevent disease, including 
epidemic and contagious condi-
tions, thereby safeguarding the 
overall public health.23 Finally, 
lack of health care among this 
vulnerable population could po-
tentially lead to drug-resistant or 
more virulent strains of disease 
that would pose a risk to every-
one, not just undocumented im-
migrants.24 
 Second, the wholesale 
denial of health care and federal 
health insurance access to a class 
of people is both discriminatory 
and dehumanizing.  Access to 
health care is a human right that 
cannot be ignored.  The 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) guarantees a 
right to life and to health.25 Arti-
cle 25 of the UDHR states that 
“[e]veryone has the right to a 
EVEN IF ILLEGAL IMMI-
GRANTS DO NOT HAVE 
ANY COGNIZABLE LE-
GAL RIGHT TO GOVERN-
MENT-PROVIDED 
HEALTH BENEFITS, THEY 
SHOULD NEVERTHELESS 
BE PROVIDED WITH 
THOSE BENEFITS.  IT 
SIMPLY IS THE RIGHT 
THING TO DO. 
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standard of living adequate for 
the health and well-being of 
himself and of his family, in-
cluding…medical care and nec-
essary social services.”26 The 
United States, as a signatory to 
the UDHR, is legally bound by 
its provisions and must endeavor 
to protect the human rights, in-
cluding guarantee of life and 
health, to all peoples within its 
borders. The ethical debate 
about providing health care to 
undocumented immigrants has 
been transformed into a political 
debate.  However, we must not 
deprive a whole population of 
people access to health care 
merely because they entered the 
United States illegally.27 It is 
simply untenable to deny any 
individual access to health care 
because they broke a law, partic-
ularly when we have an affirma-
tive duty under the UDHR to 
guarantee all persons’ right to 
health.  
 Third, undocumented 
immigrants contribute to our so-
ciety in very meaningful ways.  
In fact, it can be argued that the 
services they provide are invalu-
able.  Illegal immigrants are our 
neighbors and co-workers, mem-
bers of our church congrega-
tions, and, for many of us, good 
friends.  They are hard workers, 
good parents, and productive 
members of our communities.  
They are no different than those 
who happened to be born here.  
However, many undocumented 
immigrants are willing to per-
form unglamorous jobs, such as 
washing dishes in a restaurant or 
working as a farm hand, which 
many Americans do not want.28  
While many argue that illegal im-
migration negatively impacts our 
economy, in fact “[i]llegal immi-
gration…tend[s] to provide the 
U.S. economy with workers who 
are in scarce supply.”29 Accord-
ing to Giovanni Peri, an econo-
mist at the University of Califor-
nia, Davis, undocumented work-
ers do not compete with skilled 
laborers, but rather they comple-
ment them.30 Peri found that “[i]n 
states with more undocumented 
immigrants…skilled workers 
made more money and worked 
more hours; the economy’s 
productivity grew.  From 1990 to 
2007, undocumented workers in-
creased legal workers’ pay in 
complementary jobs by up to 10 
percent.”31 Providing undocu-
mented immigrants with health 
care and coverage under federally 
funded health care programs will 
not only benefit the undocument-
ed immigrants, but will provide 
long-term societal and health 
benefits.    
 While the benefits to 
providing undocumented immi-
grants with access to health care 
coverage under federally funded 
health care programs are over-
whelming, there are some argu-
ments that challenge this view.  
For example, it has been argued 
that permitting undocumented 
immigrants to gain access to 
health care and, more particular-
ly, federally funded health care 
programs, will impose additional 
burdens on an already over-
whelmed U.S. health care sys-
tem, including hospitals.  It has 
also been argued that a burden 
would be placed on taxpayers 
and the federal budget to fund 
any expansion of benefits to un-
documented immigrants.  While 
these arguments have been ad-
vanced, securing the life and dig-
nity of all peoples within our 
country mandates that we pro-
vide undocumented immigrants 
with access to health care, as 
well as coverage under federally 
funded health care programs.  
Securing the health and safety of 
every person within our borders 
is worth the minor additional 
burden that could be placed on 
our health care systems or our 
taxpayers (some of whom are 
undocumented workers). 
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The Patient Protection and Af-
fordable Care Act and the 
DREAM Act Fail to Provide So-
lutions 
 
 The Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (“PPACA” or 
“ACA”),32 fails to provide undocu-
mented immigrants access to fed-
eral funding for health care.  The 
Act’s individual mandate provi-
sion does not cover undocumented 
immigrants.33 Moreover, govern-
ment subsidies and other benefits 
associated with the reform are sim-
ilarly unavailable.34 The individual 
mandate requirement of the 
PPACA defines “applicable man-
date” to exclude “an individual for 
any month if for the month the in-
dividual is not a citizen or national 
of the United States or an alien 
lawfully present in the United 
States.”35   
 In June 2012 President 
Obama announced that undocu-
mented immigrants who came to 
the United States as children, at-
tended school here or served in the 
U.S. Armed Forces, and met cer-
tain other requirements would be 
permitted to remain in the country 
without fear of deportation.36 Insti-
tuted by executive action, the De-
ferred Action for Childhood Arri-
val (DACA) program, or the mini-
Dream Act, permits young undoc-
umented immigrants to obtain 
work authorization.37 The DACA 
program does not, however, make 
young immigrants eligible for 
health insurance coverage under 
the PPACA.38 Moreover, the 
Obama administration has de-
‘The Social Responsibility’ 
clared that young immigrants 
granted relief “shall not be eligi-
ble” for Medicaid or the Chil-
dren’s Health Insurance Pro-
gram.39 
 Despite widespread agree-
ment among the American people 
that the United States must reform 
the largely expensive and dys-
functional health care and immi-
gration systems, there is passion-
ate disagreement about what re-
form measures are necessary.  At 
the intersection of this collision 
are the more than 11 million un-
documented immigrants currently 
living in the United States.  If ac-
cess to health care and federally 
funded health programs for all 
undocumented immigrants is too 
much to ask for, those granted 
relief under the DACA program, 
commonly referred to as Dream-
ers, are exactly the type of sub-
group that should be targeted.  
Young people who came to the 
United States at a very young age, 
often brought by their parents, are 
here to stay.  They are socially 
and culturally engrained into our 
society and they are an important 
part of our future.   
 Despite the comprehen-
sive exclusion of undocumented 
immigrants from provisions of 
the recently upheld health care 
reform legislation and the 
DACA program, undocumented 
immigrants, particularly young 
immigrants, should be entitled to 
federally funded health care.  
Even if illegal immigrants do not 
have any cognizable legal right 
to government-provided health 
benefits, they should neverthe-
less be provided with those bene-
fits.  It simply is the right thing 
to do.  An overwhelming body of 
evidence shows a direct correla-
tion between lack of insurance, 
lack of health care, and poor 
health among Americans.40 For 
example, “[t]he long-term unin-
sured face a 25 percent greater 
likelihood of premature death 
than do insured Americans, and 
uninsured Americans with breast 
or colorectal cancer are 30 to 50 
percent more likely to die prema-
turely.  An estimated 22,000 
Americans die every year be-
cause they are uninsured.”41  
This evidence of the importance 
of health insurance is likely more 
troubling when considered in the 
context of undocumented immi-
grants, who generally have no 
access to health insurance. 
 
San Francisco’s Healthy San 
Francisco Program is a Work-
able Model 
 
 In July 2006 the San 
Francisco Board of Supervisors 
adopted the Health Care Security 
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Ordinance, which created the 
Healthy San Francisco (“HSF”) 
program.42  While not health in-
surance, Healthy San Francisco 
provides access to affordable 
health care services for unin-
sured residents of the city re-
gardless of immigration status.43  
HSF provides “access to basic 
and ongoing medical services, 
including primary and specialty 
care, inpatient care, diagnostic 
services, mental health services, 
and prescription drugs” at twen-
ty-nine participating clinics and 
five local hospitals.44 
 Enrollees in the HFS 
program pay quarterly partici-
pant fees based on income, 
while employers must spend a 
minimum amount per hour on 
health care for their employ-
ees.45 Medium and large em-
ployers with over 50 workers are 
required to participate.46 Small 
employers (i.e., businesses with 
less than 50 workers) and non-
profit organizations are ex-
empt.47  Employers must con-
tribute between $1.17 and $1.76 
per hour per covered worker, 
who include all workers em-
ployed for at least 90 days and 
who work a minimum of ten 
hours per week.48 Those em-
ployers subject to the HFS pro-
gram “can satisfy these require-
ments in a number of ways, in-
cluding by directly paying for 
health care services or purchas-
ing health insurance on behalf of 
their employees, by funding 
health savings accounts, or by 
contributing to the city option.”49    
 Although highly contro-
versial, the HFS program’s em-
ployer funding requirement was 
upheld by the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals against challenges 
that it violated the Employee Re-
tirement and Income Security Act 
of 1974 (ERISA), which prohib-
its state or local governments 
from regulating employee benefit 
plans, including health insurance 
plans.50  The court found that em-
ployers could be legally forced to 
either provide health benefits to 
its workers or pay into the city 
fund for providing health benefits 
to the uninsured.51 The U.S. Su-
preme Court refused to grant cer-
tiorari, effectively ending legal 
challenges against the program.52 
 William H. Dow, a senior 
economist for President George 
W. Bush’s Council of Economic 
Advisors and a professor of 
health economics at the Universi-
ty of California, Berkeley, report-
ed in 2009 that “[t]oday, almost 
all residents in the city have af-
fordable access to comprehensive 
health care delivery systems...”53  
Moreover, he revealed that “[a]s 
of December 2008, there was no 
indication that San Francisco’s 
employment grew more slowly 
after the enactment of the em-
ployer-spending requirement 
than did employment in sur-
rounding areas in San Mateo or 
Alameda counties.  If anything, 
employment trends were slightly 
better in San Francisco.”54  What 
is most telling about the HFS 
program’s potential is that it has 
“demonstrated that requiring a 
shared-responsibility model—in 
which employers pay to help 
achieve universal coverage—has 
not led to the substantial job loss-
es many feared. The public op-
tion has also passed the market 
test, while not crowding out pri-
vate options.”55 
 The tens of thousands of 
uninsured San Franciscans that 
have enrolled in the HFS pro-
gram certainly pales in compari-
son to the roughly 11 million un-
documented immigrants living in 
the United States.  This is to say 
that the Healthy San Francisco 
program is not a perfect solution 
for providing all undocumented 
immigrants with access to health 
care and health care coverage.  
The HFS program is not even a 
perfect solution for providing 
Dreamers with health care cover-
age.  But, the HFS program rep-
resents a workable model.  At the 
end of fiscal year 2011-2012, 
concluding its fifth year in opera-
tion, the HFS program had 
46,822 participants and had pro-
vided access to care to over 
116,000 uninsured adult resi-
dents.56 The program’s office 
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visit rate per year, at three visits, 
was the same as the national Medi-
caid average, while avoidable 
emergency department utilization 
was lower than California’s Medi-
Cal average.57  HSF’s readmission 
rate, moreover, was below the na-
tional average of 18%.58  This is a 
model for access to affordable 
health care for uninsured undocu-
mented immigrants that if imple-
mented carefully could work at a 
national level.  The Dreamers are 
the perfect group on whom to test 
the model’s applicability and suc-
cess.  This is a model that should 
apply now to Dreamers, and if 
successful, eventually to all un-
documented immigrants.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Providing undocumented 
immigrants with health care be-
yond the emergency care already 
provided under EMTALA is cru-
cial.  We have a social responsibil-
ity to provide for the medical 
needs of all those within our bor-
ders, including undocumented im-
migrants.  Access to health care 
and federally funded health insur-
ance programs for the immigrant 
population at large, and in particu-
lar the undocumented immigrant 
population, is important to the 
overall population of the United 
States, as such access will help 
limit the amount of uncompen-
sated medical care provided, will 
increase the overall health of our 
population, and will foster our na-
tion’s commitment to equality and 
fairness for every person within 
‘The Social Responsibility’ 
our borders.  Enrolling Dreamers 
in a program modeled after 
Healthy San Francisco is a sensi-
ble and workable beginning, but 
we must strive to ensure that 
eventually all undocumented im-
migrants within the United States 
have unhindered access to quality 
health care.  This can only occur 
if undocumented immigrants are 
granted access to the federally 
funded health care programs. 
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The Decision 
 
 When pharmaceutical 
companies and their representa-
tives promote off-label uses for 
the drugs they produce, criminal 
charges for violating the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
(“FDCA”) will almost inevitably 
follow.  In most, if not all, of 
these cases, conversations with 
physicians and others regarding 
off-label indications constituted 
promotion of an off-label use. It 
was therefore surprising when 
the Second Circuit vacated the 
conviction of a pharmaceutical 
sales representative who verbal-
ly conveyed to a physician off-
label uses of the FDA-approved 
drug Xyrem in United States v. 
Caronia (“Caronia”).1 The de-
fendant was originally found 
guilty of conspiring to introduce 
a misbranded drug into interstate 
commerce in violation of 21 
U.S.C. §331(a).2 His conviction 
was founded on the oral promo-
tion of Xyrem to a physician in 
order to cause him to prescribe 
the drug for off-label indica-
tions.3 Following sentencing, the 
defendant argued on appeal that 
the conviction violated his First 
Amendment right to free 
speech.4  
 On appeal, the govern-
ment argued that it did not pros-
ecute defendant for his speech 
per se, but rather used it as evi-
dence to demonstrate that the pro-
moted off-label uses of Xyrem 
were intended usages of the drug, 
which were not provided for in its 
instructions.5 The Circuit Court 
rejected the government’s argu-
ment and held that the defendant 
was prosecuted for his promotion 
and marketing efforts and, there-
by, his speech.6 The court then 
held that the prosecution was im-
permissible under applicable First 
Amendment doctrines, and that 
the government could not prose-
cute pharmaceutical manufactur-
ers or their representatives for 
“speech promoting the lawful, off
-label use of an FDA-approved 
drug.”7 However, the court did 
not find the applicable FDCA 
provisions unconstitutional. 
 Although this case ulti-
mately turned upon issues of con-
stitutional law, it has clear and 
severe collateral impacts upon 
health and pharmaceutical law. 
To appreciate the significance of 
the ruling, an in-depth look into 
the FDCA and Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”) regula-
tions concerning off-label drug 
promotion is warranted. 
Acts and Regulations 
 The government prosecut-
ed the defendant under 21 U.S.C. 
§331(a) of the FDCA which pro-
hibits the “introduction or deliv-
ery for introduction into interstate 
commerce of any food, drug, de-
vice, tobacco product, or cosmet-
ic that is adulterated or mis-
branded.”8 Pursuant to the 
FDCA, a drug is misbranded if it 
does not bear “adequate direc-
tions for use,” meaning instruc-
tions under which a “layman” 
can use a drug safely and for its 
intended uses.9 At first glance, it 
would appear that oral off-label 
promotion of a drug would not 
violate this provision of the 
FDCA because it concerns mis-
branding; however, this issue 
ultimately depends upon the 
manifestation of the drug’s in-
tended uses. 
 Under FDA regulations, a 
drug’s intended uses refer to the 
objective intent of those legally 
responsible for the labeling of 
drugs, such as pharmaceutical 
companies.10 This objective in-
tent is determined by their ex-
pressions, such as oral statements 
by their representatives including 
off-label promotion.11 Thus, off-
label promotional statements 
may serve as evidence of a 
drug’s intended use that has not 
yet been approved by the FDA.12 
This would effectively make the 
drug misbranded under 28 
U.S.C. § 331(a) because the 
drug’s labeling would not pro-
vide adequate instructions for the 
off-label intended use.13 There-
fore, although the FDCA does 
not expressly prohibit off-label 
marketing, the government may 
prosecute pharmaceutical repre-
sentatives who do so.14 The Sec-
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ond Circuit in Caronia viewed this 
as the government construing the 
FDCA to “prohibit promotional 
speech as misbranding itself.”15 
 Those guilty of 
“misbranding” are subject to crim-
inal prosecution and may face im-
prisonment for up to three years, a 
fine of $10,000, or both.16 Howev-
er, it is important to note that these 
provisions of the FDCA and the 
FDA regulations apply solely to 
those responsible for a drug’s la-
beling and its representatives. The 
FDCA does not inhibit a physi-
cian’s ability to prescribe drugs for 
uses, patient populations, or treat-
ment regimens not approved by 
the FDA.17 In fact, it is often ar-
gued that such off-label uses may 
be the most appropriate form of 
drug therapy in certain situations 
and, as the Supreme Court stated, 
are “an accepted and necessary 
corollary of the FDA’s mission to 
regulate in this area without direct-
ly interfering with the practice of 
medicine.”18 Therefore, the FDCA 
and FDA do not consider off-label 
drug use in itself unlawful, but ra-
ther criminalize the promotion of 
non-indicated uses. The holding in 
Caronia effectively challenges this 
‘Pharmaceuticals, Crime, and the Constitution’ 
long held “tradition” of prosecu-
tion for off-label promotion. 
Aftermath and the Policy War 
 Although the decision in 
Caronia may be viewed as having 
a limited holding, its consequenc-
es are nothing short of extraordi-
nary. The government has repeat-
edly and successfully prosecuted 
pharmaceutical companies and 
their representatives for misbrand-
ing through off-label promotion.19 
Convicted companies face both 
civil and criminal liability for dis-
cussing or influencing physicians 
to prescribe their products for off-
label indications, and have paid 
billions of dollars to date in civil 
and criminal penalties for doing 
so.20 In the aftermath of Caronia, 
this trend should come to a halt, at 
least within the Second Circuit. 
As long as the companies and 
their representatives are truthfully 
promoting the off-label uses of 
drugs, they cannot be criminally 
liable for that conduct. However, 
widespread adoption of this inter-
pretation is contingent upon a fu-
ture Supreme Court ruling, should 
the issue ever reach the Supreme 
Court. Until then, Circuit Court 
judges who face similar issues as 
those presented in Caronia will 
have to look at it as persuasive 
authority and consider the under-
lying policy issues.  
 The Caronia decision has 
been on the front lines of the on-
going policy war concerning the 
issue of off-label promotion. The 
court itself was split and the 
majority and dissenting opin-
ions took into account the poli-
cy concerns on both sides of the 
issue. The majority justifies its 
position by citing the im-
portance of free flowing medi-
cal information, efficiency, and 
the protection of freedom of 
speech. The dissent, on the oth-
er hand, values upholding prec-
edent, safety, and ensuring the 
integrity of the FDA approval 
process above all else. Both 
sides have compelling policy 
arguments in support of their 
positions on this difficult ques-
tion, which may eventually play 
a deciding role in resolving this 
issue once and for all. 
 The majority embraces 
the potential benefits that may 
result from its decision such as 
the free flow of medically rele-
vant and potentially lifesaving 
information. The majority ar-
gues that prohibiting off-label 
promotion but permitting off-
label use by physicians unrea-
sonably interferes with both 
doctors’ and patients’ ability to 
receive treatment information.21  
 Furthermore, the re-
striction of off-label promotion 
may be a detriment to the pub-
lic by inhibiting “informed and 
intelligent treatment deci-
sions.”22 The majority strongly 
believes that “in the fields of 
medicine and public health, 
where information can save 
lives, it only furthers the public 
interest to ensure that decisions 
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about the use of prescription 
drugs, including off-label usage, 
are intelligent and well-
informed.”23 Although the ma-
jority does acknowledge certain 
fora where off-label information 
is conveyed to the medical pro-
fession, such as scientific jour-
nals and continuing medical ed-
ucation programs, it still views 
the prosecution of off-label pro-
motion as prohibiting free flow-
ing information that can inform 
treatment decisions. 24 
 The majority views phar-
maceutical companies and their 
representatives as being in an 
informed position readily capa-
ble of advising the public and 
health professionals about the 
benefits associated with the off-
label uses of their products. In 
fact, the majority presented vari-
ous alternatives to the current 
FDA regime without resorting to 
First Amendment restrictions, 
such as the government counsel-
ing physicians and patients in 
distinguishing between mislead-
ing promotion and truthful state-
ments.25 The majority’s position 
reemphasizes the belief that,“[i]f 
the First Amendment means an-
ything, it means that regulating 
speech must be a last, not first, 
resort.”26 It was this principle that 
the majority most wanted to fur-
ther and that played the pivotal 
role in shaping its decision. 
 The dissent would rather 
uphold the status quo to ensure 
pharmaceutical companies com-
ply with FDA regulations. The 
dissent holds fast to the precedent 
that the “First Amendment does 
not prohibit the evidentiary use of 
speech to establish the elements 
of a crime to prove motive or in-
tent,” and views the defendant’s 
speech as just that.27 Further-
more, the dissent argues that the 
majority’s approach departs from 
the Circuit’s precedent that pro-
motion of a certain use demon-
strates an intent that the drug be 
used for that purpose.28 While 
courts are permitted to overrule 
their own precedent, the dissent 
clearly feels that doing so will 
result in harmful standards of in-
dustry compliance with FDA reg-
ulations and the FDCA. 
 A touchstone of the 
FDCA is the premarket approval 
process that all drugs must go 
through prior to being sold. Alt-
hough the Caronia decision ap-
plies to drugs that have already 
gone through this process, it still 
bears severe consequences for the 
future of the approval scheme. 
The dissent argues that since drug 
companies can now promote 
FDA-approved drugs for off-label 
indications they no longer have 
any incentives to seek approval 
for those indications.29 The prohi-
bition of off-label promotion has 
been instrumental in compelling 
drug developers to further partici-
pate in the approval process when 
expanding a drug’s industry rec-
ognized uses, which ensures as 
well as improves the drug’s safe-
ty and efficacy.30 Essentially, by 
permitting off-label promotion 
for FDA-approved drugs, phar-
maceutical companies do not 
need to seek approval for any 
subsequent uses. This would sub-
ject the public to a plethora of 
potentially dangerous uses that 
would not be subject to the 
FDA’s approval process. 
 To illustrate this point, the 
drug Xyrem in Caronia was ap-
proved by the FDA for different 
indications on two occasions. It 
was first approved in July 2002 
for the treatment of narcolepsy 
patients experiencing cataplexy.31 
It was then approved for an addi-
tional use in November 2005 to 
treat narcolepsy patients with ex-
cessive daytime sleepiness 
(“EDS”).32 Pursuant to the dis-
sent’s theory, once approved in 
2002, Xyrem’s manufacturer 
could promote its uses for narco-
lepsy patients with EDS without 
obtaining FDA approval and 
without fear of prosecution. 
Therefore, there would be no 
need for the manufacturer to ob-
tain further approval leaving open 
the possibility for the promotion 
of a dangerous indication without 
limitations. 
 The dissent is also con-
cerned that Caronia will undercut 
the legitimacy of the process for 
new drugs seeking FDA approv-
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al. The FDCA requires a balancing 
of a drug’s benefits and risks when 
determining whether a drug should 
be approved.33 Typically, the FDA 
Commissioner considers a drug 
safe when the therapeutic gain jus-
tifies the drug’s risk.34 However, 
according to the dissent, if a man-
ufacturer can distribute a drug “for 
any use so long as it is approved 
for one use” the balancing of risks 
and benefits becomes extremely 
difficult or impossible.35 This is 
because a drug “viewed as safe for 
certain uses might be considered 
unsafe overall if the benefits and 
risks being weighed are not for a 
specific intended use but rather for 
any use at all.”36 This means that a 
manufacturer of a new drug may 
front the safest intended use dur-
ing the approval process and then 
promote any other uses afterwards 
without having to reapply and risk 
disapproval. Therefore, drugs that 
would fail the process because the 
total benefits do not outweigh the 
total risks would be approved and 
made available to the public. 
 
The Road Ahead 
 
 It is important to remember 
that the holding in Caronia is lim-
ited to the Second Circuit and is at 
best persuasive authority in other 
jurisdictions. Furthermore, the 
court did not rule any provision of 
the FDCA or its accompanying 
regulations unconstitutional; it on-
ly held the manner in which the 
prosecution proceeded was uncon-
stitutional. Moreover, the holding 
‘Pharmaceuticals, Crime, and the Constitution’ 
only applies to truthful statements 
regarding lawful off-label use. 
Any promotion that is misleading 
or false is not protected under the 
First Amendment doctrines used 
in Caronia. It may therefore be 
tempting for compliance firms 
counseling clients within the Sec-
ond Circuit to no longer warn 
against off-label promotion so 
long as it is truthful, non-
misleading, and for lawful off-
label indications. Although Caro-
nia condones this type of promo-
tion, with the FDCA and its regu-
lations still in full force this may 
continue to be a risky course of 
action. 
 However, it is equally im-
portant to remember the various 
policy implications that result 
from this decision and the benefits 
and drawbacks that come with 
them. As the majority and dissent 
make evident, there are various 
reasons for permitting off-label 
promotion and an equal amount 
for prohibiting it. Unless other 
jurisdictions follow the precedent 
set out in Caronia, there will be a 
jurisdictional split on this issue 
until the Supreme Court has the 
final say in the matter. Unfortu-
nately, the Department of Justice 
will not appeal the decision to 
the Supreme Court presumably 
fearing that it might affirm the 
Caronia decision making it 
binding throughout the United 
States. Therefore, the resolution 
of this issue is currently in limbo 
and uncertain to say the least. It 
is likely that other jurisdictions 
will continue to follow their 
precedents and prosecute those 
who promote off-label indica-
tions. However, there is always 
a chance that Caronia may find 
its way into an appellate brief 
and persuade the circuit judges 
otherwise. All that is certain is 
that this will remain a heavily 
debated and contested issue due 
to the involvement of the inter-
ests of the public welfare, free-
dom of speech, the FDA, and an 
entire industry. 
 
 
THE FDCA REQUIRES A 
BALANCING OF A DRUG’S 
BENEFITS AND RISKS 
WHEN DETERMINING 
WHETHER A DRUG 
SHOULD BE APPROVED. 
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 As the United States 
health care system continues to 
evolve, especially with the pas-
sage and upholding of the Af-
fordable Care Act, several shifts 
have occurred in the provision 
of care.1 The Centers for Medi-
care and Medicaid (CMS) re-
leased a report describing the 
impact of the Affordable Care 
Act on health insurance cover-
age.2 With Medicaid expansion 
and the mandates, health insur-
ance will extend to an additional 
34 million people in the United 
States by 2019.3  To address the 
rise in newly insured individu-
als’ need for medical care, Presi-
dent Obama has called for an 
immediate expansion of primary 
care providers including: prima-
ry care physicians, nurses and 
physician assistants.4 Even 
though U.S. medical schools are 
expanding to account for this 
increased need for primary care 
doctors, the number of residency 
positions is not increasing.5 
Therefore, these changes neces-
sitate greater autonomy to other 
primary care providers, namely, 
physician assistants.6   
 A study recently pub-
lished in the Annals of Family 
Medicine predicted the number 
of primary care physicians that 
will be needed through 2025 af-
ter the passage of the Affordable 
Care Act.7 Utilizing various 
sources of data— like the Medi-
cal Expenditure Panel Survey, 
demographic data from the US 
Census Bureau, and American 
Medical Association’s Master 
File—to forecast use of primary 
care services, the study indicated 
that the total number of primary 
care office visits would increase 
from 462 million in 2008 to 565 
million in 2025.8 The main fac-
tors contributing to this surge are 
population growth and aging.9 By 
2025, there will be a need for 
roughly 52,000 additional prima-
ry care physicians in the United 
States.10 Insurance expansion ac-
counts for 8,000 additional physi-
cians while aging and population 
growth contributes 10,000 and 
33,000 additional physicians, re-
spectively.11  
 Medicare has historically 
provided direct and indirect fi-
nancial support to hospitals for 
residency programs for doctors.12 
Since 1983, Medicare has re-
duced its indirect funding to hos-
pitals for residency programs nu-
merous times, yet the number of 
residents has increased by nearly 
25%.13 As a result of these fund-
ing cuts, some hospitals have 
shifted resources from primary-
care training to specialty pro-
grams that generate greater reve-
nue for the hospital, such as car-
diothoracic surgery.14 This has 
caused a 20% reduction in the 
number of primary care physi-
cians.15 
 With the simultaneous 
predicted increase in demand and 
reduction in supply of primary 
care physicians other forms of 
primary care providers will be 
crucial, namely, physician assis-
tants (“PAs”).16 The Bureau of 
Labor Statistics projects a 30% 
increase in employment of PAs 
from 2010 to 2020, which is rap-
id compared to the average 
growth for all other occupa-
tions.17 This demand is especially 
high in rural areas since more 
doctors are choosing to special-
ize and practice in urban areas.18 
 According to the Ameri-
can Academy of Physician Assis-
tants (AAPA), a PA is “a medi-
cal professional who works as 
part of a team with a doctor.”19 
PAs undergo educational training 
similar to that of condensed med-
ical school training.20 Applicants 
for PA programs are required to 
have completed basic science 
requirements during their under-
graduate studies.21 The majority 
of PA programs award a Mas-
ter’s degree after completion of 
2,000 hours of clinical rotation in 
addition to medical science clas-
ses.22 PAs have an extensive 
Physician Assistants in the Era of Health Reform 
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range of responsibilities including: 
executing physical examinations 
and procedures, treating and diag-
nosing illnesses, ordering and in-
terpreting laboratory tests, assist-
ing in surgeries, providing educa-
tion for patients, counseling, and 
making rounds in hospitals and 
nursing homes.23  While PA prac-
tice is a “team model approach” in 
which physicians supervise PAs, 
supervising physicians are not re-
quired to be present and direct 
each phase of PA-provided care. 
However, there are states with 
some exceptions during the early 
stages of a PA’s career.24  
 Furthermore, PAs are al-
lowed to prescribe medication 
with the supervision of a physi-
cian.25 With controlled medica-
tions, however, the ability of PAs 
to prescribe varies with state law.26 
Federal and state laws regulate 
controlled medications, or 
“scheduled drugs,” because of 
their potential for dependence and 
abuse.27 For example, Kentucky 
and Florida do not authorize PAs 
to prescribe controlled substanc-
es.28 
 Initially, state laws limited 
the number of PAs that were to be 
supervised by a single physician.29 
The ratio was generally 2:1 but 
most of these ratios have been 
modified.30 As PA practice pro-
gressed and became more recog-
nized, the need for specific ratio 
laws lessened because medical 
practice has embraced these pro-
viders as team members.31 In 
1998, the American Medical Asso-
‘Physician Assistants’ 
ciation determined that the proper 
ratio of physician-to-physician 
extenders should be left to the dis-
cretion of supervising physicians 
at the practice level and consistent 
with state law, if applicable.32 The 
American College of Physicians 
alongside the AAPA also adopted 
the belief that ratio levels should 
be established at the practice lev-
el.33  In 2012, Delaware increased 
the number of PAs that one physi-
cian could supervise from two to 
four; Illinois from two to five 
(with ratios abolished in hospitals, 
hospital affiliates, and ambulatory 
surgical centers); Iowa from two 
to five; and Virginia, from two to 
six.34 
 Since Massachusetts 
passed its comprehensive health 
reform to provide universal health 
insurance coverage, the state con-
tinues to be progressive in the 
health sector. Governor Deval 
Patrick signed a bill on August 6, 
2012 intended to improve the 
quality of health care and reduce 
costs through transparency, effi-
ciency, and innovation.35 With 
roughly $200 billion in expected 
savings over a 15-year period, this 
legislation marks the next phase 
of health care reform.36 Within 
this law, important changes have 
expanded the role of PAs.37 Spe-
cifically, health plans must recog-
nize PAs as a primary care pro-
vider.38 The PAs will continue to 
work as a team with the doctors, 
but they will largely be inde-
pendently responsible for their 
patients.39 Because of the demand 
for physician assistants, Tufts 
University School of Medicine 
and Boston University School of 
Medicine have launched physi-
cian assistant programs.40 
 In contrast, a recent Wall 
Street Journal report indicated 
that PAs in Kentucky are strug-
gling to expand their responsibil-
ities.41 Currently, the law neces-
sitates physician supervision for 
the first 18 months after certifi-
cation.42 During this time, a su-
pervising physician must be on 
site—phone interaction will not 
suffice.43 This law greatly inhib-
its practices in rural areas where 
the amount of primary care phy-
sicians relative to patients is 
low.44 A physician in rural Ken-
tucky, Dr. Naren James, ex-
plained this struggle in the WSJ 
Report.45 As a doctor covering 
two clinics that are 25 miles 
apart, it becomes problematic 
when the patient volume reaches 
levels of 25,000 annually and 
only two of his four PAs can 
treat without on-site supervi-
sion.46 The two other PAs that 
work with him are less than 18 
months on the job, so his on-site 
supervision is required.47 The 
only other state with this type of 
strict requirements is Colorado, 
but supervision is only mandated 
for the first 1,000 hours after cer-
tification.48  
 The delivery of primary 
care has indeed changed since 
the medical profession has ac-
cepted physician assistants as 
part of the overall medical team. 
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As states provide greater autono-
my to PAs, more efficient allo-
cation of resources will be uti-
lized. This greater autonomy 
will surely assist doctors with 
the overwhelming amount of 
new patients that will be covered 
under the Affordable Care Act.  
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 Among the scant hand-
ful of countries that have not 
ratified the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women 
(the Convention) are Iran, Su-
dan, Somalia, and strangely 
enough the United States of 
America.1 President Carter 
signed the Convention in 1980 
and thirty years later the U.S. 
still has not ratified it. Among 
other obligations, Article 16(1)
(e) of the Convention requires 
countries to provide women 
with the right to choose whether 
to have children.2 This is inter-
preted to further include repro-
ductive rights.3 A woman’s 
right to choose an abortion has a 
contentious and complicated 
history in the U.S., with much 
of the debate focused on the Su-
preme Court’s interpretation of 
the Constitution. This article 
takes the position that the U.S.’s 
reliance on Constitutional inter-
pretation explains the failure to 
ratify the treaty, as well as the 
potential of the treaty to help 
protect women’s reproductive 
rights in the U.S. Because the 
Convention is a stronger articu-
lation of a woman’s right to 
choose an abortion, ratification 
of the Convention would help 
protect women’s rights in a way 
that would supplement the Con-
stitution’s vague standard.  
 Before beginning a dis-
cussion about women’s reproduc-
tive rights, the argument that this 
article makes needs to be justi-
fied constitutionally.4 If the Con-
vention were signed by the Presi-
dent and ratified by two thirds of 
the Senate the treaty would have 
been ratified correctly under Arti-
cle II of the constitution.5 This is 
a different power than that of 
Section Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Article II has been 
interpreted by the courts to allow 
boarder range of legislation to 
Congress than the Fourteenth 
Amendment.6 The seminal case 
on this issue is Missouri v. Hol-
land, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) where 
a treaty was judged to be part of 
the supreme law of the land and 
to preempt state law despite 
Tenth Amendment concerns 
where no other constitutional 
provisions prevented federal ac-
tion. Similarly, Reid v. Covert, 
354 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1957) takes 
the position that the treaty power 
is unlimited except by the Con-
stitution. Consequently, as long 
as the subject matter of the treaty 
is not in conflict with the Consti-
tution, the treaty is valid law. 
Taken together these cases show 
that the federal government has a 
large amount of leeway to legis-
late through its treaty powers 
that it does not have through the 
Fourteenth Amendment. It is al-
so of note that even when Con-
gress enacts law even in an area 
where state legislation would 
otherwise be valid, the federal 
law (including treaties) preempts 
the state legislation.7 
Unfortunately, the dis-
cussion about the exact effects of 
the treaty is not the most im-
portant debate because the Con-
vention is not self-executing. 
This means that just because the 
Convention is ratified, and be-
comes part of the law of the 
land, it will not have any en-
forcement mechanisms or means 
of implementation. It will be a 
backdrop and standard to live up 
to more than a piece of legisla-
tion that is implemented and en-
forced in an day-to-day context. 
As this article discusses below, it 
will have an effect as a standard 
even if it does not supply a cause 
PAGE 27 SETON HALL HEALTH LAW OUTLOOK 
Continued... 
of action in and of itself. The 
Convention would ultimately be 
in a similar situation to that at 
issue in Medellin v. Texas, 552 
U.S. 491 (2008) where the Su-
preme Court said that while a 
treaty was an international 
agreement under which the U.S. 
had obligations, without an en-
forcement provision, it was not 
binding on states and enforcea-
ble there. In the same way the 
Convention would be a standard 
to shape and develop U.S. laws 
without creating new causes of 
action.  
 Abortion and a woman’s 
right to choose is a very political 
issue in the U.S. Many of the 
defining moments in the 
longstanding debate have been 
Supreme Court decisions setting 
out the constitutional standard.8 
The two camps (“pro-life” and 
the “pro-choice”) are especially 
divisive between political parties 
and religious groups. As a result, 
this issue features prominently 
in political campaigns and de-
bates.9 In an article arguing for 
U.S. ratification of the Conven-
tion, Ann Elizabeth Mayer, an 
Associate Professor of Law at 
the University of Pennsylvania, 
discusses the effects of religious 
groups’ efforts to counter wom-
en’s rights in the U.S.10 Mayer 
also notes that Democrats are 
more in favor of ratification than 
Republicans.11 This demon-
strates the split in American pol-
itics on the issues and how the 
political parties differ over the 
treaty. Democrats are more like-
ly to be in favor of the right to 
choose an abortion as well as rati-
fication of the Convention, while 
Republicans are less likely to be 
in favor of either.  
 Article 16(1)(e) of the 
Convention grants women “[t]he 
same rights to decide freely and 
responsibly on the number and 
spacing of their children and to 
have access to the information, 
education and means to enable 
them to exercise these rights.”12 
The article implies, but not ex-
plicitly grants the right to choose 
an abortion. In 1994, the Com-
mittee on the Elimination of Dis-
crimination against Women 
(CEDAW) concluded that under 
Article 16(1)(e) women should 
have the right to decide whether 
to have children or not.13 It also 
states that while this decision can 
be made with consultation of a 
spouse or a partner, ultimately 
this is the woman’s decision to 
make.14 Abortion is plainly a 
method that a woman could use 
to determine the number and 
spacing of her children.15 Conse-
quently an abortion is a “means 
to enable them to exercise these 
rights,” and the interpretation of 
the right by CEDAW firmly en-
closes that option.  
 Harold Hongju Koh, a 
Legal Advisor to the Department 
of State, supports ratification of 
the Convention. However, he 
takes the position that the Con-
vention does not create a right 
for women to choose an abor-
tion.16 He defends his position by 
arguing that the Convention is 
neutral on abortion (just discuss-
ing family planning matters) and 
by pointing to several countries 
that are signatories to the treaty 
that have banned abortion.17 Re-
gardless of other countries’ posi-
tions, Koh’s interpretation cuts 
against the apparent meaning of 
the treaty and CEDAW’s inter-
pretation. Abortion is a “means” 
of enabling women to choose the 
number and timing of their chil-
dren. While it is true that abor-
tion is not specifically named as 
a means that should be enforced, 
it is reasonably within the scope 
of the term. The plain and ordi-
nary meaning of the words used 
in the Convention fairly describe 
this type of “means” to choose. 
Consequently, Koh’s argument is 
helpful in trying to persuade 
Americans to support ratification 
of the Convention, but its conclu-
sion is contrary to the Conven-
tion itself.  
 One of the reasons that 
the U.S. has not ratified the Con-
vention is because there were 
people in Congress who believed 
that all of the rights enumerated 
in the Convention are previously 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
AN INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARD [FOR WOMEN’S 
REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM] 
WOULD ALLOW FOR THESE 
RIGHTS TO BE RECOG-
NIZED AND CONSIDERED 
MORE CAREFULLY IN THE 
FUTURE LEGISLATION  
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guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion.18 The fact that the Conven-
tion goes beyond the Constitu-
tion and guarantees more rights 
to women was a difficult issue 
for certain lawmakers during 
the ratification process.19 While 
it may be the case that there is 
significant overlap, the Conven-
tion provides a clearer standard 
and when it is added to the legal 
landscape, it can only support 
and uphold women’s rights. 
Constitutionally, finding and 
enforcing women’s rights be-
gins by interpreting the Equal 
Protection Clause of the 14th 
Amendment (though Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) is 
an exception because it turned 
on an implied right to priva-
cy).20 This requires judicial in-
terpretation every time that a 
new right is asserted. A list of 
enumerated rights would be 
clearer and more manageable 
because it would be a part of the 
framework of US laws and 
would help bolster the case for 
women’s reproductive rights. A 
problem arises however, be-
cause this decision is not made 
free from existing precedent. 
The U.S. has a long history of 
looking for guidance to the 
Constitution on many new is-
sues that afflicts the country, 
such as issues of gun control, 
taxation, and the right to vote 
for women and African-
Americans. Since abortion is 
such a complex and personal 
issue in the U.S. it makes sense 
that the U.S. would not ratify a 
treaty that had the slightest possi-
bility of adding weight to either 
side of this spirited and partisan 
debate.21 
 The reluctance of the U.S. 
to ratify the Convention despite 
the benefits that it offers to wom-
en’s rights demonstrates the im-
portance of the Convention and 
its potential advantages as a 
backdrop for the protection of 
reproductive rights for women. 
The set of standards would be 
more effective to protecting 
women’s rights because the 
rights would be enumerated, and 
they could better woven into the 
fabric of American society in-
stead of being imposed arbitrarily 
from a vague standard in the 
Constitution. This is preferable to 
a system where no set of enumer-
ated rights for women exist, and 
they can only be enforced after a 
case is made and proven in court. 
In the case of the right of women 
to choose abortions, the Conven-
tion is a preferable starting point 
for these rights because it is a 
clearer standard, and does not 
rely on murky and potentially 
inconsistent interpretations of the 
Constitution.  
 The Convention would 
have a discernible and positive 
effect on reproductive rights in 
the U.S., but there are propo-
nents of the Convention who ar-
gue that it will have only a lim-
ited effect if ratified. The best 
example of this mixed message 
is Koh. He encourages ratifica-
tion and adoption of the Conven-
tion to provide protections that 
his ancestral family has in Korea 
but which are still unavailable in 
the U.S.22 Nevertheless, he sim-
ultaneously asserts that the Con-
vention will not alter state or do-
mestic laws in any significant 
way.23 It seems odd to argue that 
the Convention is necessary be-
cause of the protections that it 
affords, but at the same time ex-
isting laws render it essentially 
irrelevant. 
 There are other backers 
of the Convention that ignore its 
potential effects in the U.S. A 
significant one is Melanne 
Verveer, the Ambassador-at-
large for Global Women’s Is-
sues. She advised the U.S. to rat-
ify the Convention for American 
appearances abroad, but makes 
no mention of the treaty’s effects 
domestically.24 Another organi-
zation in favor of ratification, 
GlobalSolutions.org, maintains 
that the Convention will not su-
persede domestic laws, that the 
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Convention has no enforcement 
mechanism, and therefore is no 
threat to U.S. law.25 The Con-
vention’s perceived futility hard-
ly seem like grounds for encour-
aging ratification. Even though 
all support ratification of the 
Convention, these authors focus 
on the fact that the Convention 
will not change existing laws in 
order to increase its appeal.  
 Despite these assertions 
to the contrary, the Convention 
is important and should be rati-
fied in the U.S. because it will 
have a positive effect on the fa-
cilitation of women’s reproduc-
tive freedom. The U.S. does not 
have Constitutional mandates 
that explicitly ensure that wom-
en’s rights are upheld or even 
that equality between the sexes is 
enforced.26 The implementation 
of an international standard 
would allow for these rights to 
be recognized and considered 
more carefully in the future leg-
islation. There must be some 
benefits that are worth obtaining 
as a result of ratification given 
the difficulties of compliance. In 
this case, there is more than just 
the global image boost that the 
U.S. would receive by joining 
most of the world as signatories. 
A clear standard of women’s re-
productive rights would be given 
a voice, and its application 
would improve the legalistic and 
partisan debate on abortion in the 
U.S. Because the Convention 
makes women’s rights so much 
clearer than the Constitution, it is 
a preferable standard, especially 
in regards to reproductive rights 
issues.  
 Unlike the U.S., the United 
Kingdom (the “UK”) is an exam-
ple of a country that does not face 
Constitutional issues regarding the 
legality of abortions. The UK does 
not have a written constitution that 
needs to be referred to in an at-
tempt to ensure that new legisla-
tion conforms to an antiquated vi-
sion for the country. Parliament 
passed The Abortion Act of 
1967,27 which effectively legalized 
abortion before the country signed 
the Convention in 1981, and then 
ratified it in 1986.28 (The UK has a 
reservation to Article 16, but it ap-
plies to (f), and not (e) which is at 
issue in this article.)29 The fact that 
the UK was able to do this without 
excessive litigation illustrates the 
difference between the British and 
American approaches to the issue. 
It is of note that the majority of 
people in the UK support a wom-
an’s right to choose an abortion 
and think that the government 
should not interfere.30 This shows 
that the UK has a majority of pub-
lic support for the right to choose 
an abortion, in addition to having 
legislation in place and the Con-
vention to help enforce that right.  
 Without the complex and 
dividing Constitutional issues that 
hampers change in the U.S., the 
UK was able to ratify a major trea-
ty that promotes equality and helps 
to enforce women’s reproductive 
rights. Like the UK, the U.S. had 
previously legalized abortion, but 
it was through litigation and not 
the legislature. In the U.S., both 
the partisan nature of the debate 
and the powerful role of the 
courts have made ratification of 
the Convention almost impossi-
ble. This helps to demonstrate 
that the written and controversial 
Constitution of the U.S. is what 
is standing in the way of the rati-
fication of a clearer and stronger 
standard for women’s rights.  
 Abortion remains a major 
issue in the U.S. that has signifi-
cant political and Constitutional 
consequences. Due to the clarity 
it would provide as to women’s 
reproductive rights and the im-
plied right to an abortion enu-
merated within, the U.S. should 
ratify the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination against Women. This 
is a pertinent example of an issue 
where the ratification of a human 
rights treaty would have a signif-
icant benefit to women’s repro-
ductive rights in the U.S.   
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 By the time more than 
1,000 members of the AIDS Coali-
tion to Unleash Power (“ACT 
UP”) surrounded the FDA’s head-
quarters on the morning of Octo-
ber 11, 1988, more than 62,000 
Americans had already died of 
HIV/AIDS.1 The epidemic, though 
only a few years old, was claiming 
thousands of lives a month and 
new diagnoses were increasing 
exponentially.2 The members of 
ACT UP had gathered outside of 
the FDA’s suburban Maryland 
headquarters to demand immediate 
agency action to stem the flood of 
AIDS-related illness and death.3  
Playing Doctor: How the FDA’s Regulation of Access to   
  Experimental Drugs Limits Patient Autonomy 
 The conceptual thread 
connecting the demands made of 
the FDA that day was expanding 
access to experimental drug thera-
py and treatment for the seriously 
or terminally ill.4 Although the 
FDA had implemented a new ave-
nue for access5 the year before the 
demonstration, those actually suf-
fering from terminal illness had 
not experienced any significant 
relief.6 The demonstrators de-
manded that the FDA shorten the 
drug approval process for the seri-
ously or terminally ill by allowing 
access to experimental drugs as 
early as the beginning of Phase 2 
trials.7 Citing ethical concerns, 
ACT UP also called for the end of 
double-blind placebo trials, in 
which some subjects receive a 
placebo instead of a new treat-
ment or study drug.8 While ACT 
UP’s demands were not immedi-
ately met by the FDA9, their pro-
tests raised the profile of terminal-
ly-ill patients and the groups that 
advocate for them.10  
 The ACT UP demonstra-
tion, and the FDA’s response to 
the HIV/AIDS crisis, illustrates a 
critical shortcoming in modern 
American healthcare. The desper-
ation of the protestors, who were 
driven to forcibly occupy the 
headquarters of an entity created 
to protect them, was a result of 
the FDA’s utter failure to adapt to 
the needs of terminally ill pa-
tients.11 Today, a quarter of a cen-
tury after the ACT UP demonstra-
tions, individuals with serious or 
terminal illnesses face similar 
challenges. Ironically, while 
ACT UP was protesting FDA 
inaction, today the primary ob-
stacle to accessing experimental 
treatment is a recent FDA ac-
tion.12  
 In the context of regulat-
ing access to experimental drugs, 
the FDA is tasked with assessing 
the safety and efficacy of pro-
posed new drugs.13 The FDA has 
attempted to satisfy this mandate 
by creating a multi-phase clinical 
trial process, and strictly limiting 
access to the drug while it is be-
ing assessed.14 Patients who sat-
isfy the rigorous statutory re-
quirements for entry into a trial 
may access a drug in Phase 2 
testing.15 However, those who 
are seriously or terminally ill 
typically cannot meet these re-
quirements.16 For over 25 years, 
terminal patients had to wait un-
til testing was completed, a pro-
cess that averages 12 years.17 
Since 1987, the FDA has made 
multiple attempts to expand ac-
cess to experimental drugs for 
the seriously or terminally ill, 
with little success.18 The most 
recent incarnation of this parade 
of half-measures came in 2009, 
when the FDA promulgated a 
new set of regulations to replace 
the 1987 rules.19 The new rules 
attempted to expand access to 
those disqualified from clinical 
trials by allowing access when 
the patient’s treating physician 
has determined that several treat-
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ment criteria have been met.20 
The fundamental flaw in the new 
regulations—specifically section 
312.305—is that they require the 
FDA to do a “risk-benefit” anal-
ysis of the physician’s decision 
before releasing the drug.21  
 While the FDA’s recent 
attempt to expand access to ex-
perimental drug treatment for 
the seriously and terminally ill is 
laudable, it not only falls short 
of achieving its objective, it 
oversteps its statutory authority. 
The FDA is tasked with as-
sessing the safety and efficacy of 
proposed drugs before they are 
released to the public, not with 
assessing the private, intimate 
discussions and decisions made 
between a patient and their phy-
sician.  
 
Congressional Action and the 
FDA’s Response  
 
 In drafting the Food and 
Drug Amendment and Moderni-
zation Act of 1997 (FDAMA), 
Congress explicitly set out to 
establish a route of access for 
the individual patient excluded 
from the clinical trial process.22 
Specifically, Section 360bbb 
states that individual patients 
seeking treatment outside clini-
cal trials and “acting through a 
physician...may request from a 
manufacturer or distributor...an 
investigational drug or investi-
gational device,” subject to cer-
tain conditions.23 Functionally, 
§360bbb makes no mention of 
FDA supervision or input out-
side of determining whether the 
proposed new treatment has been 
shown to be at least minimally 
safe and effective.24 Under the 
new framework, the decision to 
seek an experimental treatment is 
one for the patient and their phy-
sician alone, with the FDA merely 
deciding whether initial clinical 
trials have established some level 
of safety and efficacy.  
 In response to growing 
criticism over the discrepancy be-
tween the promise of expanded 
access under the §360bbb frame-
work and the actual functioning of 
expanded access programs,25 the 
FDA created new rules for its ex-
perimental drugs access scheme.26 
The final rules, promulgated in 
2009, established three population 
categories eligible for expanded 
access: 1) individual patients 
(including emergency requests, 
formerly known as 
“compassionate” or “emergency 
use” requests), 2) intermediate-
sized patient groups, and 3) gen-
eral access (also known as a treat-
ment protocol).27 Further, the new 
regulations established a baseline 
criteria for expanded access, stat-
ing that the FDA must determine: 
1) that “the patient or patients to 
be treated have a serious or im-
mediately life-threatening disease 
or condition, and there is no com-
parable or satisfactory alternative 
therapy to diagnose, monitor, or 
treat the disease or condition;” 2) 
“[t]he potential patient benefit 
justifies the potential risks of the 
treatment use and those potential 
risks are not unreasonable in the 
context of the disease or condi-
tion to be treated;” and 3) “[p]
roviding the investigational drug 
for the requested use will not in-
terfere with the initiation, con-
duct, or completion of clinical 
investigations that could support 
marketing approval of the ex-
panded access use or otherwise 
compromise the potential devel-
opment of the expanded access 
use.”28 Under the 2009 rules, the 
FDA evaluates the operative cri-
teria on a sliding scale, which in 
some cases could provide access 
to drugs based on as little as early 
Phase 1 safety data.29  
 In promulgating the new 
rules, the FDA intended to clarify 
existing procedure, create new 
categories of expanded access, 
and “improve access to investiga-
tional drugs for patients with seri-
ous or immediately life-
threatening diseases or conditions 
who lack other therapeutic op-
tions and who may benefit from 
such therapies.”30 In an attempt to 
balance the agency’s mandate to 
foster research and development 
while also protecting potential 
consumers, the FDA sought to 
“appropriately authoriz[e] access 
to promising drugs while protect-
THE ACT UP DEMONSTRA-
TION, AND THE FDA’S RE-
SPONSE TO THE HIV/AIDS 
CRISIS, ILLUSTRATES A 
CRITICAL SHORTCOMING 
IN MODERN AMERICAN 
HEALTHCARE.  
VOLUME VI, ISSUE 2 PAGE 32 
ing patient safety and avoiding 
interference with the development 
of investigational drugs.”31 To fur-
ther this effort at balancing the 
competing interests involved in the 
expanded access context, the FDA 
also promulgated new regulations 
to allow drug sponsors to recover 
the cost of expanded access to in-
vestigational drugs.32 Specifically, 
drug sponsors can recover the di-
rect costs of making the investiga-
tional drug available, which are 
typically limited to the costs of 
manufacturing and shipping the 
drugs as well as monitoring the 
treatment protocol.33 Finally, in 
yet another attempt to balance the 
interests of patients, physicians, 
and pharmaceutical manufacturers, 
the new rules required that doctors 
overseeing patients with access to 
investigational drugs outside of 
clinical trials report both positive 
and adverse outcomes to the 
FDA.34 Beyond ensuring that each 
instance of expanded access does 
not interfere with a sponsor’s clin-
ical testing of the proposed new 
drug, this measure seems to facili-
tate an expanded access program 
actually making a contribution to 
the FDA's evaluation of a drug.  
 Taken together, Congress’ 
creation of a pathway to access—
by passing §360bbb of the FDA-
MA—and the FDA’s subsequent 
promulgation of the 2009 rules are 
a significant development for ter-
minally-ill patients. However, 
while these measures seem to offer 
an increased opportunity for pa-
tient autonomy and decision-
‘Playing Doctor’ 
making, a single provision in the 
FDA’s new rules stands as both 
an unprecedented expansion of 
the agency’s authority as well as a 
significant obstacle to expanded 
access. Section 312.305 of the 
2009 regulations, which authoriz-
es the FDA to assess the 
“reasonableness” of a patient’s 
decision to take an experimental 
drug,35 threatens to undermine the 
promise of expanded access creat-
ed by §360bbb. Without correc-
tive action, this single provision 
could prevent seriously or termi-
nally ill patients from accessing 
the experimental treatments Con-
gress intended to authorize in the 
FDAMA.  
What the FDA’s 2009 Regula-
tions Got Right, What They Got 
Wrong, and What Can Be Done 
About It 
 
 Although the FDA pur-
portedly promulgated its 2009 
regulations in an effort to expand 
access to experimental drugs, they 
ultimately only served to rein-
force the agency’s existing prac-
tice. Further, by interposing a dis-
tant, outside regulator36 into a de-
cision-making process that 
should be both deeply personal 
and individualized,37 the 
FDA’s regulations exceeded 
the agency’s statutory authori-
ty. In an attempt to both cri-
tique the agency’s action and 
offer potential solutions, it 
would be helpful to divide the 
analysis and look first to the 
statutory and practical prob-
lems created by the new rules, 
then offer potential solutions 
for an expanded access 
scheme that seeks to address 
the concerns of patients, the 
industry, and the FDA.   
 In promulgating the 
2009 rules—specifically 
§312.305(a)(2), which dele-
gates to the FDA the risk-
benefit analysis determining 
whether a patient should re-
ceive an experimental 
drug38—the FDA has exceed-
ed the statutory mandate of the 
FDAMA.39 In passing 
§360bbb of the FDAMA, Con-
gress delegated a very limited 
power to the FDA, only in-
tending it to play its traditional 
role of reviewing clinical data 
to inform physician prescrip-
tion practices.40 Section 
360bbb does not at any point 
refer to individual patient risk-
benefit analysis and only au-
thorizes an inquiry into wheth-
er there is sufficient evidence 
of safety and efficacy.41 This 
clearly functions as a rein-
forcement of the spirit of the 
1962 Amendments and in no 
way expands the FDA’s au-
SINCE 1987, THE FDA 
HAS MADE MULTIPLE 
ATTEMPTS TO EXPAND 
ACCESS TO EXPERI-
MENTAL DRUGS FOR 
THE SERIOUSLY OR 
TERMINALLY ILL, 
WITH LITTLE SUCCESS.  
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thority beyond that point. In 
§312.305(a)(2), however, the 
FDA has created a far more in-
vasive role for itself by stating 
that the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) has both 
the discretion and the authori-
ty—not to mention the scientific 
and medical expertise—to assess 
potential patient benefits and 
risks and ultimately decide what 
is “best” for that patient.42 Even 
assuming that an outside regula-
tory body could—without first-
hand knowledge of a patient’s 
condition—actually have a bet-
ter understanding of that pa-
tient’s immediate medical needs 
than their own doctor, Congress 
explicitly prohibited such agen-
cy action in the FDAMA.43 Sec-
tion 360bbb explicitly reserved 
the type of risk-benefit analysis 
at issue here for the physician 
and their patient.44  
           In promulgating §312.305
(a)(2), the FDA not only inter-
posed itself into a situation it 
does not have the authority to 
encroach upon, it dramatically 
rewrote the fundamental role of 
the FDA.45 The FDA—in one of 
its central operating manuals—
defined its role in the clinical 
trial context as one of reviewing 
information submitted by drug 
sponsors, aggregating and inter-
preting this data, and offering 
this information as a foundation 
for prescribing physician treat-
ment decisions.46 Section 
360bbb(b)(1) of the FDAMA 
seems to reinforce this conclu-
sion by giving physicians the 
authority to weigh and assess the 
relevant factors of an individual’s 
case in deciding treatment, while 
the FDA has the authority to en-
sure that there is a sufficient evi-
dential foundation supporting the 
decision.47 Simply ensuring that 
there is enough evidence to sup-
port a physician’s decision is a 
very different proposition than 
attempting to ensure that the phy-
sician has made the right decision.  
 This type of institutional-
ized second-guessing of clinical 
treatment decisions has never 
been a part of the FDA’s mandate, 
and Congress—in passing 
§360bbb and creating separate 
duties for physicians and the 
FDA48—seems to have gone out 
of its way to reinforce this idea. 
Further, the Supreme Court has 
held that an agency, absent ex-
plicit authorization from Con-
gress, should not assume “a re-
sponsibility that runs counter to 
its previously delegated powers 
and responsibilities.”49 In promul-
gating §312.305(a)(2), the FDA 
has both violated the Brown doc-
trine by assuming a new role that 
runs counter to previous duties,50 
and overstepped the authority del-
egated by §360bbb of the FDA-
MA, which merely serves to rein-
force the FDA’s previous practice 
of assessing safety and efficacy. 
As long as patients are making 
reasoned and informed decisions 
in consultation with their physi-
cian, the FDA should limit itself 
to assessing the adequacy and ve-
racity of the data on safety and 
efficacy, and not on the substance 
of the patient’s treatment deci-
sion. 
 Historically, the FDA has 
only been one of many obstacles 
to expanded access. Perhaps the 
principal limiting factor has been 
drug manufacturers’ unwilling-
ness to shoulder the costs of par-
ticipating in expanded access pro-
grams.51 Potentially increased lia-
bility due to adverse reactions and 
decreased participation in clinical 
trials make expanded access eco-
nomically unattractive.52 In the 
past this had been compounded 
with FDA-mandated limitations 
on cost-recovery.53 Although the 
FDA has amended the previous 
regulations to allow drug spon-
sors to recover the cost of ex-
panded access,54 this new cost 
recovery is limited to the direct 
costs of making the investigation-
al drug available, which are usu-
ally limited to the costs of manu-
facturing and shipping the drug, 
as well as monitoring the treat-
ment protocol.55 Balancing the 
risks and costs of participation for 
pharmaceutical manufacturers is 
an essential aspect of a successful 
expanded access scheme.  
 The FDA’s recent deci-
sion to rule out recovery for the 
costs of research and develop-
ment will presumably decrease 
industry incentive to participate in 
expanded access programs.56 At 
the very least, allowing a drug 
sponsor to provide their product 
at or near market value would 
make participation in an expand-
ed access program slightly more 
attractive. If the industry was al-
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lowed to recoup some of the cost 
of research and development—
especially when a drug is still in 
the testing phase and not bringing 
in any revenue—not only would 
the incentive to participate in-
crease, the incentive to introduce 
new treatments for less lucrative 
illnesses would also increase. Es-
pecially in the context of drugs 
targeted towards diseases that af-
flict a relatively small population-
base, recovery at or near market 
value for expanded access would 
function as an incentive for devel-
oping new drugs for those illness-
es. This does raise the specter of 
dubious sponsors proposing dubi-
ous drugs, but §360bbb’s safety 
provisions provide a solid frame-
work for vetting treatments intro-
duced under this new cost-
recovery scheme. Increased cost-
recovery also raises issues of pay-
ment and insurance-coverage; in-
creased recovery for industry will 
mean increased cost for insurance 
providers. While this is a signifi-
cant concern, it is one that many 
other industrialized nations have 
effectively addressed.57 Even if a 
physician and patient have to ne-
gotiate or fight for insurance pre-
certification and coverage for an 
experimental treatment, such in-
conveniences would be an im-
provement over the status quo. 
Without industry participation in 
developing experimental treat-
ments, patients will not have the 
opportunity to request insurance 
coverage.  
 Similarly, in an attempt to 
‘Playing Doctor’ 
strike a balance between expand-
ing access, providing incentives to 
industry, and maintaining its re-
sponsibility for monitoring the 
development of new drugs, the 
FDA’s new regulations require 
that physicians overseeing the use 
of investigational drugs outside of 
clinical trials report all outcomes, 
both positive and adverse.58 This 
is a clear example of the FDA’s 
2009 regulations getting some-
thing right. The pharmaceutical 
industry has—since the beginning 
of expanded access—voiced a 
concern that allowing participa-
tion outside of trials will stifle the 
process. They argue that patients 
who can access a drug outside of 
clinical trials, thus avoiding po-
tentially receiving a control group 
placebo, will do so. As access ex-
pands, trial participation will 
shrink. The FDA’s newest provi-
sion ensures that each instance of 
expanded access does not inter-
fere with clinical testing, and ac-
tually provides drug sponsors 
with another source of data that 
could be reported to the FDA. In 
essence, the industry is receiving 
a supplementary source of out-
come data that the FDA will ac-
cept and include in its final NDA 
analysis. These two measures, 
allowing cost recovery at or near 
market value and mandated out-
come reporting used to bolster 
existing clinical trial data, should 
alleviate some of the pharmaceu-
tical industry’s economic con-
cerns over an expanded access 
program.   
 With expanded access, 
especially access outside the 
controlled environment of clini-
cal trials, an increase in tort 
claims arising from adverse reac-
tions seems unavoidable. As 
more and more patients get ac-
cess to drugs that have not fully 
completed “safety” and 
“effectiveness” testing, instances 
of negative outcomes will likely 
rise. Industry concern over in-
creasing liability has not been 
addressed by the FDA in the 
past, and the 2009 regulations 
are no different. Although regu-
lations prohibit asking a partici-
pant to waive any future tort or 
negligence claims,59 there are 
effective tools for mitigating lia-
bility. An increased focus on the 
importance and practical effec-
tiveness of informed consent 
would be productive here. While 
many patients will not want to 
risk the chance of adverse effects 
from experimental treatment, 
many will,60 and it is difficult to 
justify respecting the preferences 
of one class of patients and not 
the other. Although there are 
IN PROMULGATING 
§312.305(A)(2), THE FDA 
NOT ONLY INTERPOSED 
ITSELF INTO A SITUA-
TION IT DOES NOT HAVE 
THE AUTHORITY TO EN-
CROACH UPON, IT DRA-
MATICALLY REWROTE 
THE FUNDAMENTAL 
ROLE OF THE FDA.  
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concerns over decision-making 
capacity, studies have shown 
that patients in the late stages of 
an illness still make reasoned 
and informed decisions.61 In-
formed consent provides a 
framework in which these pref-
erence-based decisions can be 
made and respected while also 
providing the drug manufacturer 
with some level of liability pro-
tection.62 If the expanded access 
patient has made an informed 
and reasoned decision, based on 
initial clinical data from the 
sponsor and guidance from her 
physician, industry liability 
should be minimal. As long as 
the manufacturer follows the 
guidelines set out in the IND and 
NDA, responsibility for the pa-
tient’s decision should rest with 
the patient. This raises a final 
concern created by the 2009 reg-
ulations.  
 Section 312.60 mandates 
an intricate informed consent 
protocol that, while satisfactorily 
addressing many of the industry 
concerns discussed above, 
makes the prescribing physician 
responsible for any patient deci-
sions made under the influence 
of her medical judgment.63 Fail-
ure to follow these strict rules 
may result in loss of investigator 
privileges64 and, because these 
rules could ultimately inform 
standards of care, open the prac-
titioner up to medical malprac-
tice claims.65 By requiring a pre-
scribing physician to be as 
knowledgeable about the experi-
mental drug and its attendant 
usage protocols as its sponsor,66 
as well as potentially liable if the 
treatment is for any reason contra-
indicated for that patient, the 
FDA’s 2009 regulations establish 
a significant burden of care for 
the physician. And while this new 
standard of care makes the sec-
ondary FDA analysis required by 
§312.305 both redundant and 
cumbersome,67 it also presumably 
reduces physician participation 
rates.  
 A significant liability bur-
den is placed on the prescribing 
physician when they must know 
as much about the drug as its 
sponsor, and the risk of increased 
negligence claims resulting from 
expanded access will most likely 
drive down physician participa-
tion. However, a slight rewording 
of §312.60 should alleviate the 
concerns of prescribing physi-
cians. While the 2009 regulations 
shifted the informed consent bur-
den from the sponsor to the physi-
cian, which is entirely appropriate 
in the expanded access context, 
they failed to elucidate a clear and 
coherent standard of care. Rather 
than let a court determine what 
the standard of care is by as-
sessing the intent of the regula-
tion’s punitive measures,68 the 
FDA should have created an ex-
plicit standard for a physician pre-
scribing an experimental drug. In 
the medical malpractice context 
generally, most states use the 
“what would a reasonable physi-
cian in a similar situation have 
done” standard, which essentially 
looks to the common medical 
practice appropriate for that sce-
nario.69 Similarly, a re-drafting of 
§312.60 which explicitly estab-
lishes a “common practice” proto-
col for the expanded access phy-
sician would alleviate concerns 
over increased liability. The FDA 
should re-draft the regulation—
with input from physicians who 
regularly prescribe and administer 
experimental treatments—in such 
a way that any potential prescrib-
er has no doubt as to what his or 
her obligations are. A clear and 
explicit standard of care for the 
prescription and administration of 
experimental treatments would 
not only protect the patients who 
might receive the drug, it would 
offer a substantial liability shield 
for the prescribing physician.  
 While the risk of adverse 
effects for patients and the eco-
nomic burdens for manufacturers 
are very real and play a signifi-
cant role here, arguably the great-
est obstacle to expanded access 
created by the FDA’s 2009 regu-
lations is §312.305(a)(2). What-
ever improvements the new rules 
engendered are negligible com-
pared to the enormous setback 
§312.305(a)(2) constitutes. Its 
severe and unprecedented re-
striction on patient autonomy ef-
fectively eliminates choice in a 
scenario where choosing between 
treatments truly is a life or death 
proposition. Therefore, changing 
§312.305(a)(2) is essential to ex-
panding access to experimental 
drugs. 
 Although the FDA has 
explicitly and repeatedly rejected 
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calls for a re-wording of §312.305
(a)(2),70 this would seem to be the 
simplest and most direct route to 
rectifying the FDA’s overstep. 
Congress could amend the 
FDCA71 to directly address the 
issue, including language specifi-
cally separating the analysis done 
by physicians and the analysis 
done by the FDA. Congressional 
action of this sort would make 
§312.305(a)(2) immediately inva-
lid and subject to litigation if the 
FDA does not alter it. Patients or 
patient’s rights groups could also 
challenge the regulation on the 
grounds that it exceeds the statuto-
ry delegation of authority provided 
by §360bbb of the FDAMA, there-
fore constituting an agency over-
reach of the type seen in Brown.72  
 While litigation could 
force the FDA’s hand, and Con-
gressional action could clarify 
misconceptions and cement the 
parallel but separate functions of 
physicians and the FDA, both of 
these options are expensive and 
time-consuming. The simplest, 
most efficient, and most direct 
form of change in this circum-
‘Playing Doctor’ 
stance would be remedial action 
by the FDA itself. In crafting the 
provisions outlining the physi-
cian’s responsibilities under the 
new framework, the FDA import-
ed the exact language from the 
FDAMA.73 It would be difficult to 
argue that simply importing the 
FDAMA’s language on the sepa-
rate function of the FDA in this 
context would be untenable. In 
promulgating §312.305(a)(2), the 
FDA overstepped the authority 
granted it by Congress, and a sim-
ple re-wording of that subsection 
would radically alter the new reg-
ulations’ impact on the seriously 
and terminally ill. A revised sub-
section, echoing the mandate of 
§360bbb, would firmly place a 
deeply personal and life-altering 
decision in the hands of the indi-
viduals most qualified to make 
it—the patient and their physi-
cian. 
 
WITH EXPANDED ACCESS, 
ESPECIALLY ACCESS 
OUTSIDE THE CON-
TROLLED ENVIRONMENT 
OF CLINICAL TRIALS, AN 
INCREASE IN TORT 
CLAIMS ARISING FROM 
ADVERSE REACTIONS 
SEEMS UNAVOIDABLE.  
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“[B]oosts the activity of genes 
and stimulates the production of 
youth proteins” 
-Génifique Youth Activating 
Concentrate 
 
“Pro-Xylane™, a patented sci-
entific innovation-- has been 
shown to improve the condition 
around the stem cells and stimu-
late cell regeneration to recon-
struct skin to a denser quality.”  
-Absolue Precious Cells Ad-
vanced Regenerating and Re-
constructing Cream SPF 15 
Sunscreen 
 
“[U]nique R.A.R.E. oligopeptide 
helps to re-bundle collagen.” 
-Rénergie Microlift Eye 
R.A.R.E.™ Intense Reposition-
ing Eye Lifter 
 
 In September of 2012, 
Lancôme became the object of 
an uncommon and undesired 
form of attention for a cosmetics 
company.  The Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) issued a 
Warning Letter1 against L’Oreal, 
Lancôme’s parent company and 
the world’s largest cosmetics 
maker,2 citing the above claims 
gathered online from their ex-
pensive Genifique, Absolue, and 
Renergie skincare lines (priced 
between $60 to $350 an item for 
amounts of up to 1.7oz).3 The 
agency, charged with promoting 
public health through its regula-
tion of food, drugs, and cosmet-
ics, deemed these claims 
“intended to affect the structure or 
any function of the human 
body.”4 This intent moved these 
cosmetics to the drug category 
under section 201(g)(1)(C) of the 
Food Drug and Cosmetics Act 
(“FDCA”). L’Oreal had two op-
tions: submit their cosmetics to 
the rigorous New Drug Approval 
(“NDA”) process or discontinue 
making such claims. 
 Under the FDCA, cosmet-
ics are only permitted to make 
superficial claims of enhancing 
beauty or aesthetics. Treatment 
claims or claims with reference to 
affecting physiological structure 
or function of the body (i.e. struc-
ture/function claims) place prod-
ucts in the drug category, which 
mandates submitting products to 
an NDA that takes “on average 12 
years and over $350 million.”5 An 
NDA would require a showing of 
not only safety, but also efficacy.  
 For decades now, howev-
er, cosmetic companies have been 
walking a thin line with anti-
aging products. Products purport-
ing to physically turn back the 
hands of time without the inter-
vention of surgery are very ap-
pealing to American consumers.  
In fact, in 2011 alone, the U.S. 
anti-aging market was assessed at 
$2.9 billion.6 However, such 
claims of permanently reducing 
fine lines and wrinkles or tighten-
ing the skin, all consequences of 
aging, come across as suspicious-
ly similar to drug structure/
function claims. And with drug 
claims, there are concerns of ef-
fectiveness.   
 While cosmetic compa-
nies might not detail the biologi-
cal mechanisms contained in their 
products that imply to promote a 
youthful appearance, they make 
efforts to create the impression 
that their products are backed-up 
by science and have been clinical-
ly tested to be effective.  In fact, 
on their retail website, Lancôme 
stated that their “Absolue L’Ex-
trait” anti-aging product, which 
contains “2 million Lancôme 
Rose native cells,” had been clini-
cally studied on 41 women.7 
Brand names such as “Perricone 
MD” and “Dermadoctor” along 
with the growing use of the term 
“cosmeceutical,” a term not for-
mally recognized by the FDCA8, 
can lead consumers to believe 
that there is scientific evidence to 
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back-up anti-aging claims and 
permanent drug-like benefits de-
rived from these products.   
 Courts, too, have struggled 
with anti-aging cosmetic claims.  
In Sudden Change, the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals inter-
preted a face cream product’s 
claims advertising to provide a 
“Face Lift Without Surgery.”9  
The trial court found that the 
product only created temporary 
change in appearance and the Sec-
ond Circuit found a “vulnerable 
consumer” might reasonably be-
lieve that references to “face lift” 
and “surgery” would indeed 
“affect the structure of the 
body.”10 It determined that the 
reasonable consumer may react 
with skepticism to such claims 
and find them to be “advertising 
puffery,”11 but “the ignorant, the 
unthinking, and the credulous”12 
cannot be expected to understand 
that such unfamiliar claims might 
be an exaggeration.  In order to 
best protect the consuming public, 
the court reasoned that cosmetic 
companies do not deserve immun-
ity for “advertising puffery,” thus, 
Sudden Change had to discontin-
ue making their facelift claim.   
 Since Sudden Change, 
however, the FDA has opted to 
send regulatory Warning Letters 
instead of pursuing cosmetic com-
panies in court.13  This has left the 
cosmetics industry to be basically 
self-regulated through competi-
tion.  The FDA generally takes a 
hands-off approach, further, due 
to industry concerns about safe-
guarding trade secrets and pa-
tented and trademarked process-
es. The agency does not explicit-
ly approve cosmetics as with 
drugs, since resources are lim-
ited, but instead operates as a 
reactionary to cosmetic company 
claims.  
 It appears though that the 
FDA is beginning to rev-up their 
reactionary activities.  In Octo-
ber of 2012, the FDA sent a 
Warning Letter to Avon because 
of claims made in regards to 
their Anew product line.14 The 
letter cited the claims such as 
“The at-home answer to wrinkle 
filling injections...Start rebuild-
ing collagen in just 48 hours;” 
“[W]rinkles are a result of micro
-injuries to the skin, so AVON 
studied how skin heals… 
ANEW’s Activinol Technology 
helps reactivate skin’s repair 
process to recreate fresh skin & 
help dramatically reverse visible 
wrinkles;” and “In just 3 days, 
see tighter, firmer, more lifted 
skin.” As with Lancôme’s prod-
ucts, the FDA concluded that 
these products “are not generally 
recognized among qualified ex-
perts as safe and effective for the 
above referenced uses.” 
 Recipients of Warning 
Letters are given 15 working 
days from receipt of the letters 
to correct the violations and fail-
ure to comply could result in 
enforcement action and potential 
seizure of the products.  Legal 
teams are forced to scramble.  In 
November 2012, the FDA pub-
lished a “Close Out Letter” ad-
dressed to the Law Offices of 
Hyman, Phelps, & McNamara, 
P.C. and carbon copied the Pres-
ident of Lancôme. The letter 
stated that it appeared Lancôme 
had addressed the violations 
contained in the September 
Warning Letter, but emphasized, 
“This letter does not relieve you 
or your firm from the responsi-
bility of taking all necessary 
steps to assure sustained compli-
ance with the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act.”15  
 Given the popularity of 
anti-aging products and their 
sweeping use of structure/
function claims, additional 
Warning Letters are likely. The 
purpose of an FDA Warning 
Letter in terms of litigation re-
mains unclear and the legal in-
dustry is beginning to take no-
tice.  Attorneys at Venable LLP 
point out in their analysis of the 
FDA’s warning letter to 
Lancôme, “[F]ederal action has 
been shown to encourage con-
sumer class action lawsuits.”16 
Attorneys at Shook Hardy & 
Bacon LLP note, “Plaintiffs will 
allege that consumers were de-
frauded into purchasing the 
product because of illegal mar-
keting claims and trumpet those 
SINCE SUDDEN CHANGE, 
HOWEVER, FDA HAS OPT-
ED TO SEND REGULATO-
RY WARNING LETTERS IN-
STEAD OF PURSUING COS-
METIC COMPANIES IN 
COURT.   
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same FDA warning letters as 
proof that the marketing claims 
were deceptive under state con-
sumer fraud statutes.”17   
 In fact, Warning Letters 
are already being used in litiga-
tion by plaintiff’s firms.  Both 
Avon and L’Oreal and subsidiary 
Lancôme have been named de-
fendants in multiple proposed 
class actions for defrauding con-
sumers, of which the L’Oreal and 
Lancôme lawsuit is to be central-
ized in the District of New Jer-
sey.18  Each of the complaints cite 
to the above Warning Letters is-
sued against the companies. With 
the potential for growing class 
actions lawsuits resulting from 
FDA Warning Letters, as Shook 
Hardy & Bacon LLP write, cos-
metic companies can no longer 
afford “to take a sit-back-and-wait 
approach.”  
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 Advancements in genetics 
research are rapidly transforming 
the fields of personalized medicine 
and population research. These 
developments will introduce a 
wide range of difficult bioethical 
issues and raise many yet un-
addressed legal concerns. On Sep-
tember 5, 2012, Nature, Cell, Sci-
ence, Genome Research, and other 
scientific journals released a coor-
dinated publication of thirty arti-
cles detailing the groundbreaking 
findings of The Encyclopedia of 
DNA Elements (ENCODE) con-
sortium.1 The ENCODE consorti-
um represents new research that 
for the first time confirms that 
over eighty percent of our DNA, 
which was once thought of as 
“junk” with no function, actually 
plays a “critical role in controlling 
how cells, tissue, and organs be-
have.”2 These portions of the ge-
nome, once disregarded as non-
protein-coding DNA (ncDNA) are 
now being described as genetic 
“switches” that may lead to many 
discoveries about disease.3 
Imagine a patient walking 
into his physician’s office, hand-
ing the physician a memory stick 
and saying: “Here, look at all 3.2 
billion base pairs of my DNA and 
tell me exactly what caused my 
cancer, why it is progressing as it 
is, and how you are going to treat 
it.” According to Dr. George 
Sledge Jr., a past president of the 
The Future of Genetic Testing and the Legal and Ethical Implica-
tions of ENCODE 
American Society of Clinical On-
cology, this scenario could be-
come a reality in as few as two to 
three years.4 Advancements in the 
field of genetic testing will 
change clinical practices and pa-
tient expectations, shift bounda-
ries of medical malpractice law, 
expand the meaning of informed 
consent, and present new chal-
lenges in bioethics and privacy. In 
order to promote the advancement 
of personalized medicine, it will 
be important to increase genetics 
education and establish profes-
sional guidelines that recognize 
advancements made in whole ge-
nome sequencing while preserv-
ing patient confidentiality. 
 
I. Encode: the New Frontier of 
Genetic Testing 
 
 Technological innovation 
has made genetic testing more 
accessible and an increasing num-
ber of individuals now have the 
opportunity to access and inter-
pret their own genetic infor-
mation.5 The price of sequencing 
an entire human genome is drop-
ping rapidly and it may soon cost 
a consumer only $1,000 for an 
entire genetic blueprint.6 This 
genetic blueprint can reveal pre-
dispositions to cancer, diabetes, 
and even psychiatric conditions.7 
The cost of sequencing the entire 
genome, consisting of more than 
20,000 genes and 6 billion DNA 
building blocks, will soon be less 
than that to perform individual 
tests for cancer or metabolic dis-
ease.8 
Whole genome sequenc-
ing has already made promising 
developments in the field of tar-
geted gene therapy.9 In 2009, the 
Memorial Sloan Kettering Can-
cer Center conducted a phase II 
trial of the kidney cancer drug 
Everolimus on patients with 
bladder cancer.10 Although the 
trial was unsuccessful overall, 
one patient (Patient X) respond-
ed remarkably well to the drug 
and went into complete remis-
sion.11 The researchers then used 
array-based tools to perform a 
targeted search of the Patient X’s 
tumor DNA for mutations and 
variations.12 When that did not 
produce significant results, they 
sequenced the tumor’s entire ge-
nome to detect potential bi-
omarkers.13 This whole genome 
sequencing revealed that there 
were indeed two mutations 
THE ENCODE CONSORTI-
UM REPRESENTS NEW   
RESEARCH THAT FOR THE 
FIRST TIME CONFIRMS 
THAT OVER EIGHTY    
PERCENT OF OUR DNA, 
WHICH WAS ONCE 
THOUGHT OF AS JUNK 
WITH NO FUNCTION,     
ACTUALLY PLAYS A   
CRITICAL ROLE IN CON-
TROLLING HOW CELLS, 
TISSUE, AND ORGANS    
BEHAVE. 
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unique to Patient X.14 Upon ref-
erencing previous studies, scien-
tists discovered that one of these 
mutations had been shown to 
sensitize patients to the same 
protein that is targeted by Evero-
limus, likely deducing the 
source of Patient X’s positive 
response.15 Scientists believe 
that experiments in this vein can 
continue to identify previously 
undetected subtypes of disease 
that can then be targeted and 
treated through personalized 
therapies.16 
Whole genome sequenc-
ing is likely to be used increas-
ingly as a discovery platform.17 
Namely, the federal government 
spent $288 million to support 
development of the Encyclope-
dia of DNA Elements 
(ENCODE), an international re-
search collaboration that follows 
up on and supplements the Hu-
man Genome Project (HGP).18 
The goal of the HGP, an interna-
tional, collaborative research 
program jointly managed by the 
U.S. Department of Energy and 
the National Institutes of Health, 
was to map and sequence the 
genes of the human body.19 In 
2003, the HGP was successfully 
completed.20 ENCODE now 
aims to provide a deeper under-
standing of the “functional” ele-
ments of the genome and serve 
as a catalog of these segments.21 
One of ENCODE’s most 
ground-breaking discoveries is 
that certain non-protein coding 
regions serve much larger func-
tions than previously thought.22 
So far, four million switches, also 
called transcription factors or 
“regulatory genes,” have been dis-
covered.23 Study results found 
that regulatory genes are responsi-
ble for common diseases such as 
Crohn’s disease and about 17 var-
ious types of cancer. 24 Gaining 
understanding of these networks 
of genetic switches may prove to 
provide new targets for drug ther-
apy and greatly expand personal-
ized medicine.25 Namely, genome
-based research will eventually 
allow scientists to develop highly 
effective diagnostic tests to better 
understand the health needs of 
people based on their unique ge-
netic make-ups, and to design per-
sonalized treatments for diseas-
es.26 
Laboratories and clini-
cians will benefit from collaborat-
ing to understand the relationships 
between sequence variations and 
health conditions within the con-
text of ENCODE’s findings. Clin-
ical decisionmakers will be also 
need to take these findings into 
account in order to avoid inappro-
priate recommendations that may 
cause patient harm.27 As data on 
current practices on genetics re-
porting and its impact on health 
outcomes continues to accumu-
late, it will be important to survey 
these practices and how they link 
to patient outcomes. These new 
discoveries will reshape the 
boundaries of medicine and 
should be taken into account 
when addressing legal and bioeth-
ical quandaries that will inevita-
bly arise as whole genome se-
quencing becomes more preva-
lent. 
 
II. The Changing Landscape of 
Liability 
 
The possibility of linking DNA 
variations with health conditions 
will result in unprecedented ways 
to predict and treat diseases.28 In 
a pilot study Mike Snyder, the 
head of the Center for Genomics 
and Personalized Medicine at 
Stanford University, decided to 
sequence his own genome in or-
der to demonstrate the capabilities 
of personal genomics.29 Snyder 
explained that he wanted to se-
quence his DNA to see if it would 
predict conditions that he might 
be at risk for, particularly those 
that were not evident from his 
family history.30 The sequencing 
revealed that the seemingly 
healthy Snyder was at high risk 
for type 2 diabetes.31 Snyder stat-
ed that he believed that the early 
detection would allow him to 
manage the risk through diet and 
increased exercise, thereby miti-
gating an otherwise debilitating 
disease.32 
Although advancements in 
whole genome research will play 
a role in making medicine more 
preventative, personalized and 
effective, there are significant 
gaps in the U.S. system of genetic 
testing oversight that can lead to 
harms.33 Further, customs in the 
genomics industry are not yet ful-
ly developed.34 As genetic testing 
continues to grow exponentially, 
the number of qualified clinical 
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geneticists and genetic counselors 
is unlikely to meet the demand, 
and an increasing amount of gen-
eral physicians may be expected to 
offer, interpret and convey genetic 
tests results.35 Thus, increased val-
idation and acceptance of genetic 
testing in clinical practice could 
result in a challenging time for 
physicians.36 Physicians will be at 
the forefront of genetics medicine 
and may be faced with changing 
forms of liability for medical mal-
practice, lack of informed consent, 
and the legal duty to warn. 
 
III. Medical Malpractice: Stand-
ard of Care 
 
 As physicians incorporate 
genetic services into their practice, 
the framework for analyzing medi-
cal malpractice cases will change. 
Medical malpractice claims are 
based on negligence37 and must 
include a duty owed by the physi-
cian to his patient, a breach of that 
duty, causation, and damages.38 
The physician-patient duty is 
unique in that it is upheld if the 
physician meets the required 
standard of care.39 Generally, the 
standard of care is measured by 
the level of care demonstrated by 
other physicians in the same field 
in terms of skill, knowledge and 
care.40 
 Genetics knowledge, skills, 
and abilities vary greatly across 
the discipline, making it difficult 
to make standard of care determi-
nations. In a survey of six allied 
healthcare training programs, 78 
percent of graduates reported that 
‘Future of Genetic Testing’ 
they received marginal to no in-
struction on genetics knowledge 
and skills.41 However, even 
though they had minimal levels 
of genetics education, these pro-
fessionals were still responsible 
for providing clinical services 
relevant to genetics, such as tak-
ing family genetic histories and 
counseling patients on the genetic 
basis for the disorders.42 As the 
personal genomics industry 
grows, it will be important for 
primary care providers to equip 
themselves with the necessary 
knowledge and skills to assess 
patients’ situations. The wide 
range of genetics care providers, 
ranging from geneticists who 
have medical degrees to laborato-
ry technicians, implies that some 
types of providers may be more 
qualified than others depending 
on the nature of the test and the 
complexity of the condition at 
issue.43 
Currently, the American 
Medical Association (AMA) pre-
dicts that only ten percent of phy-
sicians possess the requisite 
knowledge to use genetic test-
ing.44 Due to the low percentage 
of general physicians who offer 
genetic testing services, it may be 
difficult to establish a standard 
of care that would give rise to 
liability for failure to administer 
genetic testing services.45 How-
ever, as more genetic tests for 
common chronic disorders be-
come incorporated into primary 
practice, even health care pro-
fessionals who do not have spe-
cialized training in genetics may 
be held to the same standard of 
care as clinical geneticists. This 
may impose general practition-
ers with a heightened standard 
of care and resulting malpractice 
cases that they are not prepared 
to prevent. 
This issue is compound-
ed by the fact that patients may 
be more confident in their pri-
mary physicians’ ability to con-
vey genetic services than statis-
tics should currently suggest.46 
The AMA reported in a survey 
that over 60 percent of respond-
ents would choose their primary 
care doctor as their first consult-
ant on genetic disorders.47 In 
addition, about 80 percent re-
ported feeling “very confident” 
or “somewhat confident” that 
their primary care provider 
could advise them or their fami-
ly members about risk for devel-
oping inherited cancer, counsel 
them about available genetic 
tests, and interpret results from 
the test.48 However, a separate 
study conducted by the National 
Cancer Institute concluded that 
only 40 percent of primary care 
physicians and 57 percent of ter-
tiary care physicians felt that 
AS PHYSICIANS INCORPO-
RATE GENETIC SERVICES 
INTO THEIR PRACTICE, 
THE FRAMEWORK FOR 
ANALYZING MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE CASES 
WILL CHANGE.  
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they were qualified to recom-
mend genetic testing for cancer 
susceptibility to their patients.49 
Studies have shown that 
the level of genetics knowledge 
of the primary care provider 
greatly determines willingness 
to offer genetic testing and ser-
vices.50 Attitudes and acceptance 
of testing are also dependent on 
complex balancing tests of the 
benefits, risks, and costs of ge-
netic testing.51 Notably, provid-
ers will be faced with the chal-
lenge of constantly maintaining 
knowledge of what tests are cur-
rently available, and how accu-
rate and valid the tests are.52 The 
burden of attaining rapidly 
changing knowledge about ge-
netics, including new findings 
that come from ENCODE, may 
prove to be a deterrent for pro-
viders who do not wish to incur 
liability for care related to genet-
ic services.53 
Further, even if a physi-
cian purports not to offer genet-
ics services, plaintiffs may still 
succeed in bringing a case under 
the current standard of care. If 
there is sufficient knowledge in 
the medical community that a 
certain set of gene mutations 
cause a particular disease to de-
velop, and the physician does 
not follow up with a patient 
whose medical records show 
these gene mutations, which in 
turn lead to that patient’s inju-
ries, the physician could face 
liability under this standard.54 
The physician may argue that 
due to his limited background in 
genetics related care, medical cus-
tom would not dictate him to fol-
low up with his patient regarding 
the predicted disease.55 However, 
if a reasonable person, given the 
prominence of the predictive test, 
would have conducted follow up 
care, medical custom may not 
prescribe the outcome.56 This rea-
sonable person objective standard 
has been applied by at least one 
court in a medical malpractice 
setting.57 In Helling v. Carey, the 
court stated that although an early 
glaucoma detection technique us-
ing air puffs tests was not in rou-
tine use by ophthalmologists, the 
court could impose liability for 
breaching the standard of care.58 
The court stated that “irrespective 
of its disregard by the standards 
of the ophthalmology profession, 
it is the duty of the courts to say 
what is required to protect pa-
tients.”59 Under this same reason-
ing, the lifesaving potential of ge-
netic testing and follow up care 
could lead courts to impose liabil-
ity for physicians who fail to uti-
lize available testing and care. 
 Physicians who do choose 
to offer genetic testing services 
will be exposed to even more 
forms of liability. For example, 
they could be held liable for an 
incorrect interpretation of test re-
sults and for recommending a 
suitable course of treatment or 
drug therapy. Further, physicians 
will have to consider the fact that 
simply revealing genetic infor-
mation to patients could have un-
expected effects on the patients’ 
psyche.60 To prevent these situa-
tions, it will be crucial for physi-
cians to establish obtain informed 
consent with patients before en-
gaging in genetics services. 
 
IV. Recommendations: In-
creased Education and Uniform 
Standards 
 
 Newly emerging genetic 
discoveries and testing techniques 
such as whole genome sequenc-
ing are likely to be accompanied 
by an onslaught of litigation pre-
viously unseen by physicians and 
courts. Presently, the majority of 
physicians is not adequately 
trained and educated about ad-
vancements in genetic research 
and may be unaware of legal con-
sequences. Currently, no state or 
federal laws exist to address 
whole genome sequence data 
comprehensively, while specific 
laws designed to protect genetic 
information in general typically 
address where the data is collect-
ed and by whom, but may or may 
not offer protection.61 In order to 
assist the medical community to 
adopt these valuable new re-
sources, as well as to provide 
courts with a suggested standard 
of care, it will be important to in-
centivize increased genetics edu-
cation and a set of uniform medi-
cal practice guidelines. 
 The development of prac-
tice guidelines and protocols for 
testing will help physicians by 
providing a reference for the 
changing standard of care and 
serve as strategies for patient 
management and clinical decision 
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making. In addition to helping 
physicians with decision making 
in patient care management, courts 
may benefit from having these 
practice guidelines in malpractice 
litigation as a reference to the cur-
rent standard of care. This will 
help promote efficiency and uni-
formity and reduce wasteful litiga-
tion that may deter physicians 
from incorporating genetic coun-
seling and testing into their prac-
tices. These guidelines may also 
be used for patient education and 
could possibly lower the risk of 
physician liability by resolving 
ambiguity as to the governing 
standard. Genetic malpractice ac-
tions may force physicians either 
to overuse genetic diagnostic test-
ing to defend against genetic mal-
practice suits or to avoid genetic 
services altogether by making 
blanket referrals.62 Without such 
policies and guidelines physicians 
may fear litigation and may not be 
able act responsibly, leaving 
courts with the burden of deter-
mining when a duty exists. With 
both the medical and legal com-
munities better prepared for the 
obstacles that will accompany 
newly emerging genetic technolo-
gies, the genetic revolution can 
continue to make unprecedented 
breakthroughs in personalized 
care. 
 
 
‘Future of Genetic Testing’ 
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 Currently, laws in the Unit-
ed States assume a person has not 
consented to organ donation absent 
express consent by the person or 
by a family member. The burden 
of obtaining consent is largely 
placed on health care profession-
als.1  However, a majority of states 
have experimented with “opt out” 
provisions for certain organs from 
the 1960’s to the early 2000’s.2  
These presumed consent statutes 
assumed that a decedent had con-
sented to the posthumous donation 
of organs, unless an objection was 
made by either the person while 
alive or by a family member after 
the person’s death.3 Since the 2006 
Revised Uniform Anatomical Gift 
Act, which eliminated the pre-
sumed consent provisions found in 
the 1987 version, states have uni-
formly abandoned presumed con-
sent statutes in favor of less con-
troversial--and arguably less effec-
tive--means of organ procure-
ment.4 However, the rest of the 
world has not followed. Many 
countries in Europe and the Middle 
East have included “opt out” pro-
visions in their organ donation 
laws.5 While a delicate balance 
must be achieved between pre-
sumed consent’s effectiveness of 
organ donation and the ethical con-
cerns raised in an “opt- out” sys-
tem, today’s tired and ineffective 
system of organ donation is in des-
perate need of an overhaul, and 
presumed consent statutes may be 
an effective remedy. 
 The shortage of organs in 
the United States is a monumental 
crisis for patients and physicians 
alike. Although 95% of the na-
tional population indicates sup-
port for organ donation, only 42% 
have committed to be organ and 
tissue donors.6 The gap between 
the supply of available organs and 
the patients needing a transplant 
widens each year. Over the last 25 
years, the number of transplants 
more than doubled, but the wait-
ing list grew about six-fold.7 To-
day, over 110,000 people are on a 
waiting list for an organ, and 
roughly 18 of those people will 
perish each day.8 In 2011, a total 
of 6,669 patients died while wait-
ing desperately for the arrival of a 
matching organ.9  
 
Federally Imposed Limitations 
To Organ Donation 
 
 In promoting different and 
more controversial organ dona-
tion policies, it is critical to pro-
vide the two major influences up-
on state organ donation laws. The 
federal government prohibits the 
sale of human organs under § 274 
(e) of the National Organ Trans-
plant Act (NOTA).10  NOTA pro-
vides that it is “unlawful for any 
person to knowingly acquire, re-
ceive, or otherwise transfer any 
human organ for valuable consid-
eration for use in human trans-
plantation if the transfer affects 
interstate commerce.” While 
seemingly straightforward on its 
face, NOTA affects many other 
types of possible organ procure-
ment legislation that are less con-
troversial than a blatant sale of an 
organ. Various proposed benefits 
for organ donors including half 
price drivers licenses, estate tax 
credits, and partial coverage of 
funeral expenses could run afoul 
with NOTA’s ban on valuable 
consideration for organs.  
 Similarly, the Uniform 
Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) 
was drafted by the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws and attempt-
ed to harmonize state laws re-
garding organ donation.12  While 
itself not legally binding, history 
has shown that the UAGA heavi-
ly influences state legislation. 
The UAGA was originally enact-
ed in 1968 and was promptly 
adopted by all 50 states.13 The 
first revision was in 1987 and 
more than half of the states 
ALTHOUGH 95% OF THE 
NATIONAL POPULATION 
INDICATES SUPPORT FOR 
ORGAN DONATION, ONLY 
42% HAVE COMMITTED 
TO BE ORGAN AND        
TISSUE DONORS  
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adopted the revision in full.14  The 
latest revision, occurring in 2007, 
has been adopted by over 30 
states.  
 
History of Presumed Consent 
Legislation in the United States 
 
 Presumed consent statutes 
were present in nearly every state 
from the 1960’s to the early 
2000’s. The statutes were initially 
intended as a way to address the 
serious shortage of corneas and 
organs throughout the nation.15  
While most of the early statutes 
were limited to cornea or pituitary 
gland removal, the implications 
were drastic.16   Seven years after 
Georgia adopted a presumed con-
sent statute, the number of cornea 
transplants skyrocketed from 25 to 
1,000.17  During a nine-year period 
after Florida enacted a presumed 
consent statute, cornea transplants 
increased from 500 to 3000.18  
Similarly, in Alabama, presumed 
consent statutes resulted in the 
state having more corneas than it 
needed for transplantation.19   
 Despite the success of the 
presumed consent statutes, federal 
courts began hearing complaints 
about certain states’ statutes vio-
lating due process. Firstly, in 
Brotherton v. Cleveland, the Sixth 
Circuit found the wife of the dece-
dent had a property right over the 
cornea and organs.20  The wife of 
the decedent had informed the hos-
pital that she did not consent to 
an anatomical gift.21 Neverthe-
less, the coroner’s office removed 
the decedent’s corneas without 
inquiring about any possible ob-
jection.22  The 6th Circuit, in in-
terpreting the Ohio presumed 
consent statute, found that the 
wife of the decedent clearly had a 
possessory right to the body and 
an anatomical gift could not be 
made with the presence of her 
objection.23   Similarly, the Ninth 
Circuit found a procedural due 
process right in regards to the re-
moval of organs.24  In Newman v. 
Sathyavaglswaran, a coroner 
avoided any efforts to speak with 
family members about the remov-
al of organs so he could not be 
halted by any objections.25 The 
circuit court once again conclud-
ed that a procedural due process 
right exists when dealing with the 
removal of organs. However, in 
both of these cases, the rights 
awarded to the plaintiffs by the 
courts were already given to the 
plaintiffs in the presumed consent 
statutes. These cases were not a 
referendum by the courts as to the 
validity of “opt out” provisions, 
but merely a strict statutory in-
terpretation of the presumed 
consent statutes themselves. 
Nonetheless, the drafters of the 
2006 UAGA eliminated pre-
sumed consent provisions, citing 
multiple lawsuits regarding 
property rights of surviving fam-
ily members as their reasoning.26 
Subsequent state organ donation 
statutes began eliminating their 
presumed consent provisions.   
 
Current State Approaches In-
tending To Increase Organ 
Donation Are Insufficient 
 
 After the numerous law-
suits nationwide challenging 
presumed consent provisions, 
states began introducing new 
methods to increase the numbers 
of donors. Initially, a few states 
gave public recognition and hon-
ors to organ donors. The Maine 
legislature passed an Organ Do-
nor Awareness Day in 1999, 
making December 3rd a day in 
which the Governor of Maine 
publicly recognizes one donor, 
recipient, or listed person per 
year during the Organ Donor 
Awareness Day celebration.27  In 
New York, Governor Pataki 
signed legislation establishing 
the New York State Gift of Life 
Medal of Honor program.28 The 
program was created to 
“recognize the selfless life-
saving contributions of organ 
A TWENTY-TWO-
COUNTRY COMPARISON 
INDICATED THAT PRE-
SUMED CONSENT STAT-
UTES MAY INCREASE OR-
GAN TRANSPLANTATION 
BY 25-30%.  
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and tissue donors.”29  A medal is 
presented to families of de-
ceased donors and to the living 
donors of organs, bone, bone 
marrow, and blood stem cells.30   
 More recently, a number 
of state legislatures are attempt-
ing to enact statutes forcing peo-
ple to contemplate organ dona-
tion. In 2008, Governor Codey 
passed the “New Jersey Hero 
Act.”31 The act requires New 
Jersey residents, when applying 
for a driver’s license, to make a 
decision regarding organ dona-
tion. 32 If a person does not wish 
to become a donor or designate a 
decision maker on their behalf, 
they must check off a box ac-
knowledging that they have re-
viewed the importance of mak-
ing an organ donation decision.33  
To further the consent of dona-
tion, the act requires mandatory 
organ donation education for 
high school students. The Act 
also provides for a much needed 
online donor registry via elec-
tronic signatures.34   
 Similarly, in 2012, the 
New York legislature passed 
“Lauren’s Law” aimed at in-
creasing the low number of or-
gan donors through its driver’s 
license applications.35  The 
measure would change the appli-
cation of a driver’s license and 
include a section that applicants 
“must fill out” by either joining 
the organ donor registry or 
choosing to “skip this ques-
tion.”36  A member of the Save 
Lives Now New York Founda-
tion, who pushed for the measure, 
explained, “We want people to 
just have a momentary contem-
plation of the decision, even if the 
decision is that they don’t want to 
help right now.” 37  
 However, the inclusions of 
the aforementioned provisions 
have only gradually affected the 
donor rate in the respective states. 
While the Hero Act raised the do-
nor rate from 18 to 31 percent, 
New Jersey is still 11 points be-
hind the national average of 42 
percent.38 With 95 percent of the 
national population supporting 
organ donation, but only 42 per-
cent of that population designat-
ing themselves as organ donors, it 
is clear that “opt in” provisions 
relying on the generosity of do-
nors are insufficient.  
 
Presumed Consent Provisions 
Found in Europe and Asia Have 
Been Effective  
 
 In Europe and Asia, where 
organ shortages are comparable to 
the United States, many countries 
have adopted presumed consent 
provisions. A twenty-two country 
comparison indicated that pre-
sumed consent statutes may in-
crease organ transplantation by 25
-30%.39 Singapore first performed 
a kidney transplant in 1970, but 
shortly thereafter found its volun-
tary system of organ donation was 
not supplying enough organs.40 In 
June of 1987, Singapore passed 
the Human Organ Transplant Act, 
instilling a system of presumed 
consent limited to kidney dona-
tions.41 After the adoption of pre-
sumed consent provisions, kidney 
procurement jumped from 4.7 per 
year to 31.3.42 Spain’s presumed 
consent provision, which has 
helped Spain attain the world’s 
highest rate of actual donation, 
considers any decedent a possible 
donor as long as a formally regis-
tered opposition has not been 
filed.43 Belgium passed a similar 
law in 1987 and, after twenty 
years of implementation, less than 
2 percent of the Belgian popula-
tion registered an objection to 
their status of organ donor.44 Sim-
ilarly, Austria has enacted provi-
sions that procure organs irre-
spective of relative’s objections 
so long as a registered objection 
had not been filed.45  The procure-
ment rate quadrupled within 8 
years of the provision and is cur-
rently twice as high as the pro-
curement rate in the United 
States.46 Conversely, when Den-
mark switched from an “opt out” 
provision to an “opt in” provision, 
donation rate fell by 50 percent.47   
 
Presumed Consent Statutes Are 
An Effective Remedy to the 
United State’s Organ Shortage 
 
 While advances in tech-
nology and medicine have kept 
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people alive much longer than in 
the past, similar progress in organ 
donation policy has not followed. 
With waiting lists growing larger 
each year, policies reliant on altru-
ism and tragedy have proven in-
sufficient. Federal courts have 
made clear that a due process right 
exists in the removal of organs. 
However, an “opt out” system 
does not violate such a right—it 
embraces it. Statutes requiring an 
honest effort by doctors and hospi-
tal administrators in finding dis-
senters within the family further 
the constitutional rights of the de-
cedent along with family members 
and ensure the best possible 
chance of harvesting invaluable 
organs. A presumed consent stat-
ute does not foreclose someone’s 
wishes against donating organs if 
they did not elect to opt out; ra-
ther, their wishes live on with their 
family. With Europe and other 
parts of the world adapting suc-
cessful and progressive presumed 
consent statutes, the United States 
should adapt a similar system. The 
110,000 people on the waiting list 
deserve it.  
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